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EDITORIAL

THE MAJOR PAPERS, ETC.

Under the title of *The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body* the Bishop of Oxford has issued the documents relating to the question of heresy raised against the Rev. H. D. A. Major, Ripon Hall, Oxford (Mowbray, 2s. net). They include Mr. Douglas's original delation; Mr. Major's defence, which he has already published separately under the title of *A Resurrection of Relics* (Blackwell, 2s. net); the Bishop's letter to Mr. Douglas, conveying his judgment ; and the opinions of the three Oxford Professors (Dr. Headlam, Dr. Lock, and Dr. Watson) to whom the Bishop referred the question at issue. The handling of the matter seems to us eminently calculated to inspire confidence among Church-people generally. Dr. Headlam's interpretation of St. Paul's teaching will commend itself to all who believe that the English tradition of New Testament exegesis is essentially sound; and there will be general agreement with him when he says that "as regards the Fathers, Mr. Major . . . exaggerates their opposition to himself."

The controversy, however, raises one or two side-issues which are worthy of note. The gist of Mr. Major's defence turns upon the contentions that:

1. Ancient and mediæval theologians are almost unanimous in interpreting the resurrection of the body as implying the resuscitation of the actual physical elements laid to rest in the grave: but that this view was abandoned by English theologians generally in the middle of the last century, under the inspiration of F. D. Maurice, in favour of a non-materialistic doctrine of resurrection.

2. This change was due "not primarily to any general philosophical or scientific theory, but is the result of the application of modern methods of literary and historical criticism to the interpretation of Scripture."

Granted that the main contention, although stated in an exaggerated way, contains an element of truth, the ground of the development is a matter of much interest, and

one that might have employed Mr. Major's pen at greater length. In the first place, so far as it is due to exegesis, it seems to us to be inadequately accounted for by "modern methods of literary and historical criticism." Modern exegesis no doubt avails itself of modern instruments; but its primary purpose is to discover what the writers of the Scriptures meant; and in that process the tradition of correction, criticism, and fresh discovery has been continuous from the earliest times. Exegesis is not controlled, but only conditioned, by its methods; what controls it is its dominating interests and motives. And we think it will be true to say that every fresh advance in biblical interpretation has been motived by something outside itself, in the world of contemporary events and ideas. The experience of the community finds itself confronted with a new situation in thought or action; and it turns back to Holy Scripture for the normative expression of its experience in the words of Christ and His Apostles. "General philosophical or scientific theories" are precisely among those facts of contemporary life which do in truth most commonly lead to a change in teaching. Thus, for example, the progress of geology led to a radical re-interpretation of Genesis; ecclesiastical movements in this country have provided the stimulus to a fresh study of the Pastoral Theology of the New Testament; and our understanding of St. Paul and St. John has been profoundly influenced by the achieved results of Comparative Religion. A real answer to the question as to what caused the change in the interpretation of the resurrection of the body would go far towards showing what measure of agreement there was between Orthodox and Modernists. It was for a purpose such as this that we pleaded in these columns a year ago for the appointment of a Doctrinal Commission.

The point at issue in the Major papers has been the mode of men's resurrection: the Resurrection of Jesus Christ was not in question. Mr. Major, however, has prefaced his own publication of his defence by an Introduction, where he proceeds to extend his principles to embrace the doctrine of Christ's Resurrection. This is only to be expected in those who adopt the fundamental assumption that Christ is to be interpreted by reference to ordinary men, and not *vice versa*. But, that being so, the title which Mr. Major has chosen for his defence is open to serious objection; for not only is this Modernist assumption contrary to the root principles for which Maurice stood, but the phrase itself comes from a passage in one of Maurice's Essays, where this contrast is made quite exceptionally clear (*Theological Essays*, Essay VIII., pp. 168, 169 [1853]).

THE TEMPTATION IN THE WILDERNESS: A POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION

ALTHOUGH so much has been written about the Temptation, there is yet room for more; for the one thing certain is that the mystery of it is unfathomable, and its teaching inexhaustible.

It is here presupposed* and pre-required—(1) That the order of the temptations in St. Matthew's Gospel is the right order; (2) that the Tempter was unseen; (3) that the temptations took place only within the mind of Christ, and in no sense in space. These are in themselves reasonable suppositions. (1) (*a*) The temptation to worship Satan is of a different character from the other two, and does not come in naturally between them. (*b*) It is reasonable to think that when "Jesus saith unto him, Get thee hence, Satan,"† Satan did get him thence. (2) It is never said that our Lord saw Satan, nor that He knew it was Satan tempting Him during the first two attempts. The story, as afterwards narrated, of course shews it to have been Satan; but it does not say that Christ knew it at the time. When the Tempter comes to us and says such things, we do not see him, nor do we usually recognize his action, but treat the suggestions as having come out of our own mind. And the form of Christ's answers to the first two suggestions as contrasted with the third would seem to shew that He in like wise treated them. (3) As it is usually assumed that Christ saw the Tempter with His bodily eyes, although probably under another guise, so the temptations are often represented as having taken place, in some sense, in space: the first in the wilderness, the second in Jerusalem, the third on a mountain, Christ having been transported bodily from one place to another, and finally carried back to the wilderness. But this element of marvel or magic only adds difficulties to the story; and it is not required. "All the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them" are just as much or as little visible from the wilderness as from any mountain, however exceeding high. It is not necessary to be standing bodily-wise on a pinnacle in order to think of falling or floating. In the case of our own temptations in such matters no special spatial conditions are necessary. The glory of foreign lands attracts us as we sit quietly in our own homes, and in the same way does

* There are other more general presuppositions which need hardly be mentioned, such as that of the existence of evil spirits, and of the authenticity of the narrative as being at least based on a story told by Christ Himself to the disciples.

† Matt. iv. 10.

imaginary adventure draw us. Even the dullest of us know this experience. And in the Perfect Man the great quality of imagination must have been keener and fuller than in most of us imperfect creatures. So it seems reasonable to suppose that when the three temptations took place He was in the wilderness all the time.

If this was so, there is no interval required between the three; but they may have followed immediately one on another, although each or any of them in itself may have occupied some considerable time.

Then comes the great question, What may have been in the Lord's mind when these temptations presented themselves?

Our guesses at an answer will be based, roughly speaking, on three things: First, on our own experience of temptation; secondly, on the little which the New Testament directly tells us about our Lord's temptations, together with all that it, with the Old Testament, tells us of His Person and character; thirdly, on what we have reason to think may have been chiefly filling His mind when He went into the wilderness.

It is mainly this third consideration on which there seems room for questioning the views generally held.

According to all four Gospels, Christ had gone to St. John Baptist where he was baptizing in Jordan. St. John had borne witness to Him, and had reluctantly baptized Him. On His baptism, He "went up straightway out of the water: and, lo, the heavens were opened unto Him, and He saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and lighting upon Him: And lo a voice from heaven, saying, This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased."*

The traditional interpretation, with variations in detail, is that, the wilderness being a preparation for His work, He went there full of the thought of His Messiahship and the work to which as Messiah He was called: this work being, of course, recognized by Him as far larger in scope than the redemption of Israel alone: "It is a light thing that Thou shouldest be My servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give Thee for a light to the Gentiles."† This being so, the temptations were in respect of His Messiahship and its work, and of the new powers of which He was conscious. Thus they were, baldly speaking, temptations to use His powers and His position as Messiah to effect the work of the office more easily: to sustain His own life, to effect speedy conviction, to make compromise, real or apparent, of principle, for the sake of assured and complete success.

* Matt. iii. 16. † Isa. xlix. 6.

There can be little doubt that the Messiahship and ministry to which He had just been publicly called and divinely endowed must have occupied much of His mind. But may it not have been something even deeper and higher and broader which really filled His being at that crisis? He had heard the voice "from heaven, which said, Thou art My beloved Son; in Thee I am well pleased."* The Holy Ghost had "descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon Him." Doubtless, He had even before this known Himself to be Son of God, as also He had known Himself to be Messiah. But it is natural to suppose that until this moment He had been able to live with these overwhelming facts in some measure shrouded from His consciousness. Whether this was because He was not able fully to know or because He was able not to know these things is another question. Perhaps it was both. It is a mark of the strongest minds to be able to judge what is better for them not to know and to be able not to know it, and to practise this not only in regard to external means of knowledge, but also to refrain in their own minds from considering such and such a fact, or following out this or that train of thought. And there is abundant indication of Christ's superlative powers in this regard all through His life, and that He daily practised a stern self-limitation which must have been not the least hard condition of His earthly life. And we can see that in His early days it must have been imperatively necessary to keep a strong restraint on thoughts which would have made it doubly difficult to lead the life of a village carpenter at home. He had grown up, as St. Luke is not afraid to say, increasing not only in stature, but also in wisdom and in favour (or grace) with God and man. That was, of course, a gradual natural growth: natural according to His human nature, supernatural at least as man (and He above all other men) is "naturally supernatural." But now, at His baptism, there was an immense sudden access of wisdom and grace. The voice and the descent of the Holy Ghost not only marked what was there before, but also made a real difference. They were not only signs of what already existed, but they were "a work worked."†

They had also shewn that the time was now come for facing

* Luke iii. 22.

† It may be that the Church, repelling and condemning the heresies which made Jesus become Son of God at His baptism, has shrunk from laying all the stress which should duly be laid on the events of the Baptism as making an immense sudden change, comparable with what took place at the Resurrection. In other cases, notably in the matter of Patripassianism, theologians have tended to deny or minimize a truth which had been exaggerated into a heresy. By rights, it should be the other way—if one may venture to say so—for most heresies are a signal to the Church to emphasize some point which has been unduly neglected.

His Messiahship and His Sonship. Both these tremendous truths had now been, as it were, brought home to Him, and He had acknowledged them to Himself. They stood out before Him as the hidden thought stands out in the moment when it has passed into the spoken word or significant act. They had been ratified on earth by St. John, from heaven by the Father and His Spirit. Whatever else "My beloved Son" may mean, and whatever else it might at that time have meant to other people, to Jesus Christ Himself it must have meant His own unique relation to the Father. The knowledge of His Messiahship and of His own divine Personality, which had been able to run silently under His everyday life at Nazareth, was now in full flood and bore all before it.

But which was the greater, the Messiahship or the Sonship? the doing or the being? Surely, in that overwhelming crisis, the one engrossing thought must have been that of His relation to His Father, the one feeling the sense of adoring love for His Father, the one passion the desire to be—if that were possible—more and more well-pleasing to His Father. And within this, included and wrapped up in it, would lie, as of indeed great yet lesser import, the Messiahship and all which that involved.

So He would go into the wilderness full of the thought of His own Father and of His own Sonship. He Whom we confess as "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made," was, with whatever limitations in His human nature, face to face with this stupendous relation.

This, then, would be His outlook at the time of His temptation. Then, when He was an hungred, what more natural than to think that surely His Father* would be pleased that He should procure for Himself bread to eat by means which the Father Himself had just put into His hands, and which could assuredly not in the least injure any other human being? So natural indeed is it, that in seeking to explain why it would have been wrong, commentators give many and mutually incompatible reasons. He Himself afterwards said that *any* father would desire to give his child bread just because the child asked: much more if it were in dire need. But then—whether after a long cogitation or almost immediately there is nothing to shew—came the application of a principle which He had learned as a child,† and He saw that to make a stone into a loaf for Himself would be a lack of trust in His Father. His Father's time was not yet come, as He said later to His mother about His own time for such a miracle.

* And we must not forget that God is Mother too.

† Deut. viii. 3.

Then—very swiftly, one would think—would come a swinging away from the least touch or shadow of mistrust; and the next temptation was to do some act which would shew His Father plainly His absolute trust in Him. His Father would, He knew, not only keep Him from dying of hunger, but would keep Him alive and unhurt in doing what would be certain death to any ordinary man. There was Scripture for it, too.* The hungry flesh which had suggested the first temptation was now quickened by the eager spirit, and ready for spirited action. But no: it would not have been really trust. It would indeed have been a test of His own trust; but He had no right to test the Lord His God. His Father might be trusted to read His heart without any such manifestation. If He had carried out the suggestion it would have been really a lack of trust.

The next temptation is best approached by reasoning from what we ourselves or the most generous people we know would feel if they realised that they had in any way sinned, or even been within what seemed measurable distance of sinning, against their best-beloved. Would they not feel impelled to humiliate themselves to the ground in self-reproach and abasement? How could I have done such a thing? How could I have even thought of it? What can I do to make up for it in any way? Is there anything too sacred to sacrifice for him whom I have wronged, or who may have ground for suspicion that I have wronged him even in my inmost thought? How many men have told lies, believing a lie to be always wrong, to save a friend! How many more women have surrendered their ideal and all they held dear, against their deliberate conscience, but out of sheer generosity or pity!

So may it not have been with the Lord? Our Lord was more generous than any mere human being could be—of a generosity of which the Cross has revealed a little. He was more sensitive to the shadow of sin than the best of sinful men can be to actual sin. It hurt Him more. May He not have felt that He had come within the shadow of wronging His Father by mistrust? Then would come the impulse to any possible self-abasement, the crying out for some way of reparation. What could He do? The Tempter was at hand and saw his opportunity. The Son Whom the Father had sent into the world to bring the world back to Himself could win it back and present it to His Father in a moment, by an act† the most humiliating, the most abhorrent to His perfect nature

* Ps. xci. 11, 12.

† Or acts. All three temptations may have been to a course of action as well as to a single act.

that could be imagined. Such an act was presented to the Lord's mind. But it was presented only to be instantaneously and absolutely rejected: "Get thee hence, Satan." Christ knew at once whence the thought originated; it could never have sprung out of His own mind; it could only be from the devil. And then He recognized that all the temptations had been the devil's work. That was the end. Then the angels came and ministered unto Him.

It need hardly be said that this sketch of the story is not intended to do more than to give a very rough conjectural outline of what may have been the main course of the temptations, on the supposition that Christ's consciousness of Sonship worked as the leading element in it. It may be pleaded that this guess at part of the inner meaning of the story should be judged the more generously because at first sight—though not in reality—it seems to run counter to the prevailing tendencies in the study of our Lord's life. The following considerations may help to explain and commend the position, although it need not stand or fall with any of them:

I. The very words into which the first two temptations shaped themselves suggest that it was His Sonship which was filling the Lord's mind. If it had been the Messiahship or the work to which He had been consecrated, one would expect the form to be, "If Thou be the Lord's Anointed"—or words of like meaning. But it was as Son of God that the temptations touched Him: "If thou be Son of God." *Prima facie*, the question appears clearly to be, not what may be suitable for Messiah to do, but what may befit God's Son. And if "My beloved Son" had for Him the meaning here claimed (p. 130), the actual words should have great weight.

The force of this consideration is the same whether the form of words presented itself to the mind of Jesus at the moment of the temptations, or whether, as some think, this was the summary made later in His own mind and given to the disciples.

II. Christ had "suffered being tempted,"* it would seem, in two ways, as we also suffer, He being "in all points tempted like as we are, sin apart."†

When we desire something not wrong in itself, but wrong for us in our circumstances, or when we naturally shrink from something which appears to be our duty, we suffer from the conflict between our duty and our natural desire or aversion; partly from the denial of the desire or the imagination of the proposed suffering, partly from the force of the struggle.

There may be no sin in a temptation beyond what alloy

* Heb. ii. 18. † Heb. iv. 15.

there always must be in the best doings of humanity. The issue may be meritorious. St. James says, "Desire, when it hath conceived, giveth birth to sin."* But not until it hath conceived by being admitted into the will. This seems to have been the kind of suffering of the first two temptations. There was the suffering from hunger, which was the occasion of the first temptation, the suffering from resistance to the natural sinless craving for food, and the suffering from uncertainty and mental conflict. And the same, at least in part, in the second temptation.

But we also suffer in a very different way when we are tempted to do or shirk something which it would be horribly wrong to do or shirk, or to think horribly evil thoughts such as blasphemy, unbelief, uncharity. From the first inception such temptations are hateful. The very onset of them is felt as an attack and a suffering. And yet they sometimes persist, and we cannot at once drive them off nor flee from them, even through prayer. Then we perhaps recognize them as attacks of the devil, and so find relief. So in the temptation to worship Satan does our Blessed Lord appear to have suffered, at least momentarily.

III. We have to reason from our own experience to the experience of our Blessed Lord: our own experience, and what the Bible tells us. But we must be careful to reason in the right direction; that is to say, upwards, from lower man to higher man, and from higher man—a hazardous step—to Perfect Man. Thus a lower man is tempted to obtain food in a wrong way only for the pleasure of eating, when he is not even hungry. A higher man is tempted thus to obtain it only when he really needs it for some good use, such as to be able to do good work. It is not unreasonable to expect to look higher than that in trying to guess—if we dare guess at all—what was in the mind of Christ when He thought of providing Himself with bread. And so with the other temptations. We are not taking into account all the given conditions when we envisage the temptations as on the level of the ordinary common-sense person who reflects that if he dies of hunger he will be of no use to the world. Esau is the type of that "profane person." Nor is it on the level of the lover of adventure, still less on that of the seeker for effect, that one should seek the chief clues to the interpretation of the temptation of the pinnacle. It is quite true that it is part of the full perfection of manhood to retain all wholesome childish instincts: and among them, to like pleasant food; still more, to enjoy adventure. It is an impoverished narrow nature which has in it nothing of the child or of primitive man, and is out of sympathy with children

* Jas. i. 15.

and child races. The more "human nature" in anyone, the better. But perfection requires not only abundance but also proportion, with strength to co-ordinate and control all in subordination to and for the enrichment of a central main aim. So in the one Perfect Man, such instincts would be in full strength, and so be capable of being occasions or starting-points for temptation, while at the same time the co-ordinating strength would be so immeasurably greater than in imperfect men, that the occasions would never thus be taken up, but be turned into starting-points or opportunities for higher good. If this is true of the first two temptations, still less should we search out the third temptation along the lines of the seekers for power, spiritual or material, who are tempted by their own twisted, warped nature to do evil that good may come to the world through their success. To the Perfect Man such temptations as these could be no temptation at all; and the Tempter would have known that it would be useless to present them.

The interpretations which make Christ tempted to safeguard or expedite His work do not seem to go high enough, but to postulate a certain self-centredness or self-regardingness which does not enter into the character of even the highest people among us sinners. And our Blessed Saviour was Love incarnate. Through love, then, and above all the love of His Father, it would seem natural that He should be tempted.

Generally and roughly speaking, every human action or refusal to act springs from some special occasion, usually what might be called an occasion within an occasion, on a gradually receding background of general and quasi-permanent conditions. The occasion need not always be external: it may be some thought springing up, as it were, spontaneously or through some train of reflection in the mind. When to the mind of a good Christian such an occasion suggests an act or refusal to act which is out of harmony with the general conditions of his deliberate course of life, he calls it a temptation. But the suggestion usually makes a struggle long or short, violent or faint, to represent itself as harmonious or to be harmonized with the main current of the life; and while this struggle lasts, it is a matter with which not the will—or not the will only—but chiefly the reason is concerned. This is usually not so with honest minds in the case of anything plainly "wrong"; but only in the case of such actions as are not in themselves wrong, but yet inconsistent with the deliberate general purpose of the man's life. In every deliberate right act the whole man acts, and acts with an effective if latent reference to the one aim of his whole complex life.

In the temptation to make a stone into bread, it is common ground that the occasion or starting-point was extreme natural

hunger causing desire for food. The question is, What had this desire to harmonize itself with before it could take effect in act? If it is true that what was filling and flooding the Lord's whole being was the new consciousness of His own eternal Personality, then this is what the desire would first have to accommodate itself to; and, at first sight, it would do so easily, through the thought of the Father's love. It would be a conflict rather for the reason than the will. And this fits in well with the truth that sin lies not in the reason but in the will.

For the second temptation there may have been no occasion but the simple desire to shew trust in His Father.

And—if the considerations presented in this paper are roughly true—the occasion of the third temptation was a direct personal act of the Tempter, taking advantage of the immediate set of the current of the Lord's love to His Father.

IV. It has sometimes been called puerile to suppose that Jesus could have been seriously tempted to satisfy hunger; and therefore, it has been supposed, the account of this and of the other temptations was purely symbolic. No one who had experienced real deadly hunger could think so. It might be worth making the experiment personally. But perhaps the most academic of minds have now learned the truth through war-stories.

On the other hand, it is in accordance with symbolic teaching, both in the Old and New Testament, to find a real act made the *point de repère* or starting-point for symbolic teaching. Ezekiel performed many such acts—even if his longer courses of action were only commenced and not carried on. So did Isaiah and other prophets. Even if it be held that these acts were not carried out in physical space but only in their imagination, that is all that our present purpose requires: for the Lord's temptations also were only in His imagination. The tradition or instinct is found still at work when Agabus takes Paul's girdle to bind his own hands and feet before he can utter his prophecy concerning Paul. In a similar way does the Lord's Anointed use a passing event or a single act as a concrete starting-point for far-reaching truth. "Shew Me a penny," He says, and requires the coin to be brought and described before He will give His great teaching on it. He washes the disciples' feet before His last teachings. He notices all kinds of homely doings such as breadmaking, patching of clothes—for He was a poor cottager's child—sowing corn, taking up nets; and as He notices them, He sees them full of symbolic import, and about some of them He tells us some of what He saw. In every small concrete thing He could see the infinite significance.

So, in the Temptation, it is not for us a matter of having to choose between the literal concrete fact and its symbolic out-

come or interpretation: we can hold fast to both. There is room for the widest symbolic application of the temptations; and for many of such, both to Christ's own personal life and to Israel at that time, and to us now as individuals or nations or parts of the Church. And it may well be that it was in the interests of some one or more of these symbolic applications that He may have vouchsafed to reveal to the disciples* this wonderful story.

It may be objected that in a life of many temptations, as that of Christ, He would not have thought enough of the wilderness temptations to have spoken of them to His disciples if the temptations had been in respect of particular acts and had thus been quickly over. But we only have to think of our own lives to realise that some experience which lasted but a moment has made an ineffaceable impression on our whole after-life. A religious conversion, a shock of bad news, a sudden illumination, may change the whole life. Life is not measured by the clock. And in a lesser degree this takes place when in some perhaps trifling occurrence we have kept thinking over something about it which has struck us, and so we have made of it a sort of *point de repère*, or standard of reference, for many widely differing experiences, fulfilling for our individual mind a function something like what a proverb fulfils for a nation.

So, again, we have a single concrete experience with an indefinitely multiplied significance and value.

V. From a fifth point of view there appears ground for a reinterpretation of the inmost character of the Temptation. Being is more fundamental than doing. The relation of humanity to God is more important than the works of man. And we find it a mark of the saints that they know God cares more for what they are than for what they do.

If so, then Christ, the Saint of saints, must have known this. And, therefore, it seems reasonable to think that, after His Baptism, it was what He was, and His relation to His Father, which at this crisis filled His mind, rather than the work He was to do during His life on earth.

On more than one ground, then, there seems reason to admit an enlargement of our attempts at interpreting this great mystery—a mystery so deep that at first sight it would seem more reverent not to search into it: and yet we may be sure that our Master would not have told us the story but that we might study it for our profit.

SISTER AGNES MASON, C.H.F.

* Unless it was to His mother He told it. This would seem a natural thing to do, particularly at the time of leaving her home for His public ministry: and it adds slightly to the probability that, according to John iv. 1-14, she is found, shortly afterwards, to be the first to expect of Him the exercise of extraordinary powers, and when not indeed bread but wine was lacking.

ON DEVELOPMENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS

A PAPER READ BY INVITATION AT A CONFERENCE OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH UNION HELD AT YORK ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1921.*

THE subject upon which, by the kind invitation of your Secretary and Committee, I am asked to speak this afternoon to the members of your Union is large and difficult and in some sense still novel. It is a big thing to discuss, even in outline, the sense in which Christianity had the right to develop, and the extent to which, between the first century and the twentieth, it has in fact developed. It is a hard thing to attain to a right equipoise in giving due weight alike to considerations that demand, and considerations that condition, development. And it is more or less a new thing; for not only does the term itself hardly (I suppose) go back beyond the publication of Newman's great work in 1845, but the whole attitude of mind which development embodies in a definitive word depends on, and corresponds to, the growth among us of historical criticism. Even though I shall take the simpler road and start from the observance and examination of the actual facts, I am afraid that, in trying to follow out our thought to just conclusions, this paper may make some inroad upon the attention, the patience, and perhaps even upon the prejudices and presuppositions, of its hearers. Nevertheless, the task seems to be worth attempting.

Nothing, then, in the intellectual sphere distinguishes more clearly the Christianity of the last hundred years from the Christianity of all the centuries that preceded than the emergence and dominance of the historical spirit. For good or for evil, we have learned to look upon our religion historically. We cannot stand outside the mental orientation and equipment of our own age; and the science of history, as applied to Christianity, was almost newborn in the nineteenth century. Whether we look on the history of the Christian society from within or from without, with sympathy or with criticism, with passionate absorption or with cold disdain, we have all of us to conceive of a process in which each period is linked on to what precedes and what follows, and the elements of continuity and of change in this perpetual process have to be estimated and compared. Development is nothing more nor less than the concentration of this conception into a single term: it is neither a bogy to be frightened of, nor a magical charm and talisman to save us trouble, but the symbol of a new method. To John Henry Newman we owe, if not the word itself, at any rate the introduction of the word into the current coin of our theological

* [This paper has been rewritten for publication, but its substance has not been greatly changed.—C. H. T.]

vocabulary; and Newman himself tells us where he found best exemplified the conception and method of which he fixed the name. "It is melancholy to say it, but the chief, perhaps the only, English writer who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian is the infidel Gibbon."*

If it is in general true to say that no conclusion in the domain of Christian theology is likely to show itself satisfying or valid unless it allows for the coexistence and mutual interaction of diverse and seemingly contradictory elements, then this problem of development, theologically regarded, is only of a piece with the other problems which Christianity calls on us to face. For certainly of this problem nothing can pretend to be an adequate solution which does not find room for the fundamental elements of both stability and progress, or, if you prefer the quasi-scientific terminology of our day, both the static and the dynamic elements. Our New Testament documents themselves express the germ of both ideas. There is the faith once delivered to the saints, the faith of the leaders held up for imitation by their followers, that is, Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; but there is also the office of the Paraclete, who is to lead us into all the truth. We have the truth already, yet we have to be guided into its fulness.†

Our problem, then, is to correlate the one element to the other, to try and see, in broad outline, how and to what degree the fixed element is to condition and control the element of movement. In this inquiry the obvious line for an historian to take is to examine the facts, in order to see what has been the actual course of events in this or that department of Christian life and doctrine. And I am sanguine enough to think that there is material worth collecting, and that the investigation ought not to be without result.

One topic beyond all others held and focussed the interest of Christian thinkers of the first generations, as they tried to draw out the implications of the faith they believed and to exercise upon them their faculties of reasoning. "What think ye of Christ?" was the question that pressed insistently for an answer; and the work of Christian theology from St. Paul to St. Athanasius was in the main the effort to provide it.

If the Creed of Nicæa—the confession that Jesus Christ is coeternal and consubstantial with the Father—had been put before any ordinary Greek-speaking Christian of the primitive community at Jerusalem, he would certainly have found it

* *Development* p. 5. [All references are to the original edition. In the editions from 1878 onwards the book is to some extent recast, no doubt to the advantage both of its arrangement and of its style. But it was the book of 1845, not any later recasting of it, which marked an epoch.]

† Jude 3; Heb. xiii. 7, 8; John xvi. 13.

quite unintelligible; it was cast, he would have said, in terms that meant nothing to him. The utmost that one could suggest is that if a Catholic and an Arian formula had both been presented for his acceptance, he would have found more jarring elements in the latter than in the former; and I am not sure—remember that we are thinking of the time behind St. Paul's earliest epistles—that it would be true to say even so much. But merely to point the contrast between formulated and unformulated theology does not take us far. It is no solution of the problem.

If, on the other hand, we set ourselves patiently to follow out the facts that lie between Jerusalem and Nicæa, we shall find that the history of the first three centuries after Christ is the history in this respect of an agelong process, in the course of which Christians were working out slowly, tentatively, painfully, the essential content of the ideas which had formed round the person of their Master from the time of His life among men. As they tried to plumb the secret of the impression that from the first He made on them, and of the attitude in which from the first they found themselves standing towards Him, some forms of explanation were tried which failed in the end to satisfy, experiment was made of some paths which were found to lead to no issue. Yet all along advance was being made, now rapidly, as during the Apostolic age, now more slowly, in times when new thoughts were gradually absorbed—now as it were by instinct, now by the more leisurely process of reasoning, most often, perhaps, by the negative method of rejecting solutions that were offered, till the long story culminated in the issue raised by the Arian conception of the nature of the Son of God and the crystallizing of the Catholic refusal of it in the Creed of Nicæa. And still another half-century had to pass before the victory of the Catholic cause was assured throughout the Greek and Latin Churches, and the work of Nicæa was finally ratified at Constantinople.

Development had clearly been at work. Scholars have rightly emphasized, as a speaking testimony to the honesty and accuracy of St. Luke's work, the inchoate and elementary character of the Christian theology embodied in the first chapters of the Acts: the original preaching of the Gospel covered, it would seem, no more than these three points, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah of prophecy, that He had really and truly risen from the dead, and that a message of universal salvation was to go out in His Name. It is a far cry from this to the Homoousion, and it was not to be expected that the course of evolution from the one to the other would run all smooth. Theology has its ups and downs. In the stress of

establishing some great advance, too little care perhaps is taken not to overpass the due proportion of truth, and incautious statements of great doctors have seriously embarrassed later generations. Even the early *élan* of Christian enthusiasm has been convicted by certain modern critics of harbouring the germs of adoptionism. "God hath made Him both Lord and Christ," cried the Apostle: what wonder, when the point to establish was the present lordship of the Risen and Ascended Jesus? That was the one thing in St. Peter's mind: Christian faith must be firmly fixed on that, before it harked back to face the mystery of His pre-existence. Yet we know how confidently St. Paul had taken that next great step when he wrote to the Corinthians and the Philippians: πλούσιος ὢν ἐπτώχευσε (2 Cor. viii. 9), ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν (Phil. ii. 6, 7).*

It would be attractive, if time permitted, to describe in detail the stages of the advance through St. John and St. Ignatius, in Irenæus and in Origen, and to note the sudden emergence in each great writer of some new formula, taking up and concentrating the scattered elements of preceding thought, some bold precision that in turn is slowly digested and assimilated till it becomes part and parcel of the common tradition of the whole body. Athanasius is from one point of view a great innovator, but it is on the basis of a continually growing determination of theological thought and language that he gathers up the latent conviction of the Christian body into a challenge embodied in a single word. How unintelligible this process would be without some such conception as that of development to be our guide and clue, we shall best realize if we cast our eyes back for a moment to the aspect which the facts presented when for the first time they began to be matter of familiar treatment and disputed interpretation in the controversies of the seventeenth century.

Almost suddenly, in the stress of the counter-Reformation movement, patristic learning became, more or less about A.D. 1600, an essential weapon in the theological armoury of the day. In turning over the massive tomes into which the scholars of that time poured their erudition so prodigally, one is of course brought up, now and again, against the gaps in their knowledge, where either new material has since come to light or erroneous estimate of old material has been modified by the work of subsequent scholars: but the first and chief impression is of the width of their horizon and of the powerful

* And not St. Paul alone. The authors of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse, for instance, stand in one sense at opposite poles to one another; but both teach in the clearest language the pre-existence of Christ. It was common ground to the writers of the second Christian generation.

sweep and scope of their outlook over Christian antiquity. It is not in the way of knowledge that one is most conscious of a subtle difference between the equipment of the men of that day and our own. It is rather that, in the first place, they left the New Testament writings outside the sphere of their real criticism; the New Testament was sacrosanct, a thing apart; if its meaning was contested, it was to be elucidated by the patristic tradition. But, in the second place, this tradition, too, tended to be regarded as a single whole. The documents were taken *en bloc*, and, even where they were examined in their chronological order, no sufficient attempt was made to trace the nexus that runs through them and both connects and differentiates them. Thus the Church writings of the ante-Nicene period must be, it was assumed, in general agreement or in general disagreement with the Nicene theology, although either conclusion meant a good deal of straining of the evidence. Only historical criticism, only the conception of development, could provide the master-key: and historical criticism (in the fullest sense) of the Christian *origines* was still an undiscovered science.

Denys Petau—or, to give his name in its latinized form, Dionysius Petavius—was, like Sirmond and Bellarmine, one of the great polymaths of the Jesuit order in its golden age, before the primacy of learning passed to the Benedictines. Petau wrote on many subjects, but we are concerned only with one small section, the preface and first eight chapters of the first book of the second of the five volumes of his vast conspectus of Christian theology, *Theologicorum Dogmatum*.* He was impressed by the difficulty of squaring a good deal of the ante-Nicene theology with the Nicene standard; and if he deserves praise for the honesty with which he faced facts, one is a little tempted to believe that he took some pleasure in exaggerating them —with a view to the more appropriate introduction of a *deus ex machina*, in the voice of the Church expressed through the Council and the Creed.

On this side of the Channel, Petau's critical methods met with scant sympathy. The appeal to patristic tradition, whether against Rome or Geneva or Zurich, was the essential mark of Anglican theology, as it shaped itself under the hands of our Caroline divines. To men thus minded the tactics of Petau seemed nothing less than the surrender of the whole position: if his interpretation of the facts was correct, the claim of Arians or Socinians to be the real representatives of pre-Nicene Christianity would be beyond dispute. Therefore when George Bull (then a parish priest, afterwards bishop of St. David's) undertook against Unitarianism the "Defence of the Nicene

* See especially *Præf.* i., § 12; iii., § 7; and I. v. 7; viii. 2.

Faith," it seemed to him crucial to re-examine with meticulous care the witness of primitive writers in relation to the Divinity and the Eternity of the Son ("*de Filii τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ*," "*de Filii τῷ συναιδίῳ*"), and having done so to claim the whole literature as Catholic. But, as Newman says,* "out of about thirty writers whom he reviews, he has, for one cause or another, to explain nearly twenty."

Neither the conclusion of Petavius nor the conclusion of Bull represented the whole truth. The method was inadequate, and the conclusions arrived at were inadequate also. "The one party estimate the theology of the early Fathers by the literal force of their separate expressions or phrases, or by the philosophical opinions of the day; the other by the doctrine of the Catholic Church as afterwards authoritatively declared. The one party argues that they *need not* have meant more than what was afterwards regarded as heresy; the other answers that there is *nothing to prevent* their meaning more."† A greater name than even Bull or Petavius resumed the task, when John Henry Newman published in 1845 his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*.

I make no attempt, I have no qualification, to speak of this epoch-making work over the whole area of its importance: I am concerned with it at this moment only so far as to see what light the study of the principle of development as contained in it may throw on the problem before us. "Developments growing out of the Question of our Lord's Divinity" is the heading of a section (viii., § 1, p. 397) intended to illustrate the fifth of the "tests of fidelity in development," namely, logical sequence. And the first sentence of the section seems to suggest that the issue raised by Petavius was directly present to Newman's mind. "No one," he writes, "who has looked ever so little into the theological works of the ancient Church but is aware that the language of the ante-Nicene Fathers, on this subject, may be far more easily accommodated to the Arian hypothesis than the language of the post-Nicene." But in truth Newman did little more than enunciate this platitude, and left the matter there. He had at an earlier point (chapter iii., § 4) criticized effectively the methods of Petavius and still more those of Bull, but his own contribution to the subject debated between them is the suggestion of a connexion between the clearing up of Catholic thought against Arianism and the introduction of the *cultus sanctorum*. Needless to say that even in this curious argumentation the genius of Newman provides matter to attract and fascinate. But he gives us no help towards the application of the principle of development

* J. H. Newman, *Development*, iii., § 4, p. 159. † *Ibid.*, p. 158.

where development concerns the most fundamental of Christian truths. In the forefront of his vision as he wrestled with the theory of development was not the controversy between Arian and Catholic but the controversy between Roman and Anglican. And perhaps historical criticism was still too inchoate, in relation to the New Testament documents, to permit at that date of a full and free review of all the conditions of the case.

We have, therefore, to face the problem for ourselves. We take our start with the most elementary data offered us in our documents—the Christology, that is, of the earliest chapters of the Book of Acts—and then try to realize the sort of process that went on during the three centuries which intervened between Pentecost and the Council of Nicæa, as Christians were consciously and unconsciously working out, whether under the leading of their religious experience or by more purely intellectual processes, the implications of their original ideas and feelings and convictions about their Master and Lord. That is what we mean by development, as a necessary postulate for the explanation of the history of Christian thought. In the light of this conception the difficulties felt by seventeenth-century scholars about primitive Christologies vanish away: for it is only what we should expect if we find that, at each stage of the effort to draw out the essential content of the inherited tradition and express it in a rational synthesis, many forms of statement were hazarded and found wanting and were replaced by others more satisfactory, until a relatively final term was achieved in the formulary of Nicæa.

Indeed, it is perhaps most often when defective theologies work themselves out to full and explicit completeness in forms which are felt to be irreconcilable with the Christian religion, that a definite step is taken forward: in this sense error is normally a condition precedent of the exacter comprehension of truth. The later growths at least of the Creed were due not so much to any positive liking for definitions of faith as to the need of some plain statement that such and such an interpretation of the fundamental Christian data, recommended as the last word in theology, was, on the contrary, either disastrously one-sided or actually false. Without Arius there would have been no Nicene Creed. It does not, of course, follow that a continued repetition of the process "new errors, more stringent definitions," is at all to be desired.

But, true as it is that development not only did take place but took place rightly, is it the whole truth? Is there not a danger that the glamour of one great and illuminating conception may blind us to another aspect of truth worth our while to consider? Granted that, as things were, and as perhaps

they must have been, the process of creed-formation was necessary and inevitable; allowing to the full that by this road the common Christian consciousness had arrived at conclusions and worked out results which could never be called into question again; recognizing gladly that to the attainment of this end was devoted some of the highest effort, of mind and soul alike, of which humanity has shown itself capable: even so, there is something to be set on the other side. Of all definitions, that of Nicæa brought the greatest gain to Christian theology at the smallest price. Yet perhaps no general rule is of more universal application than this, that every great advance is attended with some corresponding loss, however relatively slight the loss may be.

In the first place there is in the earlier writers an atmosphere of freedom and vigour which, as definition progresses, begins to make itself less and less felt. Definition means a limit put to the unrestricted play and movement of Christian thought. One-sided, or if you like erroneous, phraseology, to be found here and there in Ignatius and Irenæus, in Tertullian and Origen, is the inevitable drawback to the swift and daring flight of the finest intellects of the first Christian generations as they directed their vision to the great mysteries of religion. The air is something less exhilarating even in the fourth century than it had been in the second and third: it becomes heavier, at moments oppressive, as the centuries go on.

But, secondly, the loss which development may involve is to be traced in more direct ways than the mere circumscription of Christian thought. Man prizes most what he has won at greatest cost: and so, the fiercer the contest over the establishmend of any dogma of our Creed, the more exclusive a position will that doctrine hold when the struggle is over and the security of its place among the Christian *credenda* is at last assured. Where it has been found necessary to define a truth, to commend it in a permanent formula to the safe keeping of the Christian people, it will nearly always happen that the truth so commended obtains a pre-eminence which is liable, in spite of all the care of theologians, to disturb the delicate balance of Catholic faith. Development, that is to say, has its special element of danger: we need to be always on our guard against its over-reaching itself.

I know that it may seem a paradox to suggest that the victory of the cause for which Athanasius fought and suffered brought with it anything less than clear gain. The very existence of Christianity in any full sense of the term was at stake over the Homoousion. Athanasius was no irresponsible bigot, but a theologian with a marked sense of restraint and an unusual capacity for seeing below the surface of things. Never-

theless, even so, the teaching of the Alexandrine and the Western Churches did receive from that time onwards an accentuated bias in one direction; a difference can be traced, in those Churches, between ante-Nicene and post-Nicene theology which is not wholly to the advantage of the latter. Exactly where Newman finds, for the purpose he had in view, the advantages of development—since the cultus of the saints and the Blessed Virgin can, on his showing, be deduced from the new tendency that emerges in the West after the Council of Nicæa—exactly there it may be that development needs to be tested at every turn by the standard of earlier ages and the tradition of the Church. Nor am I thinking here merely of the over-subtle line of argument by which Newman seeks to "develop" the cultus of the saints out of the Nicene theology: other things were affected in the direction of fundamental Christian thought and worship.

I do not suppose that a Catholic Christian of the fourth century would have been conscious of any change in his religion as the outcome of the Nicene faith and creed. The confession of belief expressed in the Homoousion was, in his conviction as in ours, the only possible issue of the original premisses of Christian teaching; and the whole doctrinal tradition was so strong and vigorous that there was no danger of any immediate supersession of other and complementary truths. And in the Eastern Churches the influence of the great Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and the two Gregories, to say nothing of the school of Antioch, was a sufficient makeweight against onesided tendencies. But, at least as to certain departments of biblical exegesis, the temptation was strong in Alexandrine and Western circles to abandon earlier interpretations wherever encouragement seemed to be afforded by them to the Arian propaganda.

Thus the text "My Father is greater than I" (John. xiv. 28) was by early writers quite regularly explained of the pre-eminence of the Eternal Father as Father in relation to the Eternal Son as Son: and the traditional exegesis is repeated in the fourth century by Alexander and Athanasius at Alexandria and by Hilary and Marius Victorinus in the West, as well as by Basil and Gregory in the East. But in view of the emphasis with which the Arian party pressed their deductions from the text so explained, it came to seem the simpler course to cut the ground from under them by limiting its application to our Lord's humanity; and this became, I think, the constant usage of the Latin Church. Nevertheless it has against it the practically unanimous consent not only of the ante-Nicene Fathers but of the Nicene generation as well.

Or, again, the appearances to the patriarchs and others of a supernatural visitant from God, recorded in the Old Testament,

had been always interpreted by primitive Christian writers, as well as by the Council which condemned Paul of Samosata at Antioch, as being in a true sense Theophanies, anticipations in some mysterious way of the supreme Theophany of the Incarnation; and it was easy for Arians to suggest that there must be a difference of nature between the Father, whom no man hath seen at any time, and the Son, who could thus render Himself visible. Once more the Latin Fathers, never quite at home with the subtle distinctions in which the genius of Greek theology found its *métier*, conceived it more compatible with the defence of the Homoousion to strike out a new line and interpret the "Angel" of a created being rather than of the Eternal Son. Through the influence of St. Augustine this view came to prevail so exclusively in the West that Newman can speak of it as "the explicit doctrine which has been received since his date."* But, as Dr. Liddon admits,† "the earlier interpretation has been more generally advocated by English divines"; and one of the most learned of the second generation of Tractarian theologians has defended it at great length and with the support of a vast catena of patristic citations.‡

These were, in themselves, unimportant consequences: they did not touch the faith or life of the ordinary man. But they were symptomatic of others, less obvious and less immediate, which go deeper and approach the foundations of the Christian religion. So slow, indeed, were these latter of growth that they are hardly traceable before mediæval times and perhaps did not seriously disturb the balance of truth before the Reformation. But much post-Reformation theology, both Catholic and Protestant, has in different ways been affected by them.

Among the questions that could not fail sooner or later to demand insistently an answer, as the Christian Church tried to work out the premisses of its belief to their full conclusions, had been this—whether prayer was properly to be addressed to Christ.

Now in a pagan world monotheism was the base and starting-point of Christianity in a much more real sense than it is nowadays. And I suppose that a Christian of the apostolic generation, if asked to whom he addressed his prayers, would have replied that he prayed to his God and Father through Jesus Christ his Lord. Through Christ the high priest access is obtained to God, in Christ the Beloved acceptance is found before the Father. And this primitive instinct is enshrined for us to all time in the traditional language of the Church's common worship. Scholars have been beginning of late years

* *Development*, viii., § 1, p. 398.

† H. P. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, ch. ii., p. 88, n. 1 [ed. 10, p. 59, note l.].

‡ Peter Medd, *Bampton Lectures*, "The One Mediator," note vii., pp. 426–502.

to realize how archaic an element of Christian life is represented for us in the liturgy of the Eucharist. Here Christian prayer was translated into corporate action; and the address of Eucharistic prayer was to God the Father alone. Anything else would have been a contradiction of all that antiquity stood for.

Did then this constant tradition of common worship, expressed in the liturgies of East and West and continued in post-Nicene times in the series of Roman collects, so many of which survive in our own Prayer-Book, exclude from the purview of Christian religious life the direct address of prayer to Jesus Christ ?

No: for, constant and venerable as is the tradition which restricted the direction of Eucharistic prayer, another tradition, hardly less ancient or less clearly defined, has come down side by side with it—that of the hymnody of the Church and its address to Christ. The earliest reference in a non-Christian source to meetings for Christian worship is contained in the letter of Pliny the younger, when Governor of Bithynia (A.D.112), to the Emperor Trajan, and the central point of the account is the singing of a hymn to Christ.* About a century later a writer, probably to be identified with Hippolytus, appealed, as to a custom whereof the memory of man ran not to the contrary, to the "theologizing" of "the Word of God, the Christ," in Christian psalms and songs.† The most ancient of such compositions that have come down to us are doubtless the two Greek morning and evening hymns, Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις (the *Gloria in excelsis*) and Φῶς ἱλαρόν: of the latter the authorship was already forgotten in St. Basil's time, but he attributes it to "the fathers,"‡ while the former is among the numerous documents recast to form the *Apostolic Constitutions*,§ and no one of the documents so recast is later than the third century.

* "Carmen Christo quasi deo dicere secum inuicem" (*Ep. Plinii ad Traianum*). My colleague, Dr. Brightman, reminds me that, as "carmen dicere" had a more or less technical meaning in pagan ritual, Pliny's language may imply that the Christian congregation was repeating a form of words after the officiant. He would on similar lines interpret the κοιναὶ εὐχαί of Justin Martyr's *Apology* (i. 65 κοινὰς εὐχὰς ποιησόμενοι ὑπέρ τε ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦ φωτισθέντος καὶ ἄλλων πανταχοῦ πάντων) as forms of prayer which the minister—presumably the deacon—said first and the people repeated "in common" after him. Here then we should see the beginnings of the litanies of intercession, addressed to our Lord, which we find regularly in the liturgies.

† ψαλμοὶ δὲ ὅσοι καὶ ᾠδαὶ ἀδελφῶν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πιστῶν γραφεῖσαι, τὸν Λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν Χριστὸν ὑμνοῦσι θεολογοῦντες (ap. Euseb. *H.E.* v. 28§). Compare, too, Clement's hymn to the word at the end of the *Pædagogus*, and Origen's assertion, *contra Celsum*, viii 67, ὕμνους εἰς μόνον τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι λέγομεν Θεὸν καὶ τὸν Μονογενῆ αὐτοῦ Λόγον καὶ Θεόν.

‡ ἔδοξε τοῖς πατράσιν ἡμῶν μὴ σιωπῇ τὴν χάριν τοῦ ἐσπερινοῦ φωτὸς δέχεσθαι . . . καὶ ὅστις μὲν ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ῥημάτων ἐκείνων τῆς ἐπιλυχνίου εὐχαριστίας εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχομεν . ὁ μέντοι λαὸς ἀρχαίαν ἀφίησι τὴν φωνήν (*De Spiritu Sancto* 73).

§ *Ap. Const.* vii. 47. As re-written for the *Constitutions* the hymn is made very definitely Arian : the address to our Lord in the second part of the *Gloria* is turned into an address to God the Father.

In both our Lord is directly addressed; and both may well have been included among the "psalms to our Lord Jesus Christ" which Paul of Samosata suppressed at Antioch as novel inventions.* Whether or no Paul was right about the age of the particular hymns he had in mind, he was quite wrong, as the evidence just cited demonstrates, in asserting the novelty of the practice: the hymns may have been modern, the tradition of hymning Christ was ancient. And the hymnody of later days has certainly tended to concentrate itself more and more on this type to the exclusion of all others. The Preface to the last edition of *Hymns Ancient and Modern*, admitting that "it is often urged as an objection to Christian hymn-books, that so great a proportion of the hymns contained in them are addressed to our Blessed Redeemer rather than to the Father to whom He brings us," throws the responsibility rather on the composers of our hymns than on the compilers of the collections.

Following then the historical method, we have established the coexistence in the early Church of two sets of data, between which there is some *prima facie* inconsistency—the stringent limitation of Eucharistic prayer and the wider address of hymnody. How are we to reconcile them? Are we to say that development leads us away from the one to the other, and that it is a legitimate deduction from the faith of Nicæa that even Eucharistic prayer may rightfully be addressed to our Lord? Or should we not rather say that the peril of development is just that it tends to make us forget that a concentration of emphasis on one article of the Creed may, if unchecked and unconditioned, disturb that proportion of truth which is the preservative of sane religion?

We shall find a truer approach to a satisfactory synthesis if, instead of undervaluing either of the two elements of primitive tradition, we ask for what each of them stood, and why hymnody should have formed as it were an exception to a general rule of Christian worship.

The creed of the Christian began, and must always begin, with the confession of one God the Father Almighty; and so the first recorded instance of Christian common prayer is addressed to the Lord of all, Σύ δέσποτα (Acts iv. 24). But equally the first recorded instance of ejaculatory prayer of a Christian martyr at the crisis of his agony is addressed to the Saviour, Κύριε Ἰησοῦ, δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου (Acts vii. 59). And the long centuries of Christian experience have generation by generation ratified the appeal, and in their moments of anguish and desolation Christian hearts have turned to Him who knows the trials

* ψαλμοὺς τοὺς εἰς τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν παύσας ὡς δὴ νεωτέρους καὶ νεωτέρων ἀνδρῶν συγγράμματα (*Conc. Antioch.*, ap. Eus. *H.E.* vii. 30. 10).

and temptations of our mortal nature and with St. Stephen have called on Him to save.

Thus in Christian worship hymns or litanies addressed to our Redeemer are the natural and proper satisfaction of the Christian instinct of loyalty to Christ. They represent the emotional element, and the emotions have their right place, though a subordinate place, in worship. Even in the Eucharist we may intercalate the adoring cry *Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, miserere nobis*. But especially in the Eucharist shall we do well to guard jealously the principle of the Church's tradition of worship. There the priestly people, through and with their High Priest, plead the One Sacrifice before God. The early liturgies left no opening for the dangers to which some more modern phases of Christianity might expose us. There is no room for any contrast between a righteous Father and His merciful Son, any more than between a righteous Son and His merciful mother. The prayers in them are the prayers of Christians who, while they believed as firmly as we do in the Presence of Christ in the Sacrament, did not forget that the Gift given us is the Father's Gift, and the service offered throughout the rite is a single service from the beginning to the end. To lose the sense of the solemn restraint with which the ancient Church guarded its monotheism by tuning its common Eucharistic worship and self-dedication to the note of response to the Father's love would be not only to break all real liturgical continuity: it would be to endanger, under the shelter of development, a true safeguard of theological balance. Developments, even the greatest and most important of them all, need to be tested by repeated reference to primitive standards.

Of course, it is not easy to distinguish between legitimate development and its less legitimate consequences. But theology, *divinarum rerum scientia*, was never meant to be an easy thing. We are on safest ground when we remember that Christian theology should be at every step a harmonization of different aspects of truth.

Now if development needs guarding even when it starts from clear implications of the New Testament, and leads to the full definition of so fundamental an article of our faith as the Divinity of our Lord—if even the Nicene confession can be so emphasized to the neglect of other elements of our religion as to affect the equipoise of theological thought—if even here it is an advantage to correct our compasses from time to time by reference to the Scriptures and tradition of the earliest generations of the Church—it is not likely that the case will be otherwise on any lesser issues. Developments are inevitable: we cannot expect to do without them, and should often be the

worse if we tried to do without them ; but we need in dealing with them some more effective instrument of control than the tests which Newman prescribes, and we shall only find what we need in constant recurrence to the apostolic Scriptures and the apostolic tradition.

Let me take two illustrations from developments, actual or proposed, in matters less vital but yet not negligible.

1. The first illustration shall be from the history of the Sacrament that we call Confirmation.

How large a part development has here played, during the nineteen Christian centuries, we shall realize if we contrast Confirmation with Baptism. There have been changes even in the administration of Baptism, and controversies even over the external aspects of it. But for all that, not only is it still retained by almost all bodies calling themselves Christian, but there is an obvious identity in the rite as practised to-day and as practised in the age of the Apostles. It would be impossible to say as much of Confirmation, whether we regard the differences of usage between one Christian body and another—to say nothing of the sects that have abandoned it altogether—or the differences between each and the Church of the Apostles.

For one thing, Confirmation was in early days, from the New Testament onwards, not a separate sacrament to itself, but essentially one thing with the Sacrament of Baptism: it is by exception if they are called two sacraments. What in the New Testament is called Baptism with the Spirit is, as I understand it, nothing else than the Gift of the Spirit imparted through the laying on of hands that accompanied Baptism: and in the only ancient treatise that touches specifically on the distinction between the two rites they are correlated as " baptisma aquæ " and " baptisma spiritus." But differentiation between them has gone on increasing until Baptism and Confirmation are regarded, and have for many centuries been regarded, as two sacraments, separated normally in the West, in the Roman Church and in our own, by a considerable period of years. It has, of course, to be remembered that when most baptisms were those of adult converts, and were administered in the presence of, if not by, the bishop, the connexion of the two rites was dictated by the circumstances, and the circumstances changed when most baptisms came to be those of infants, and, since the bishop could not be ubiquitous, were administered by the local clergy.

Further, in the Roman Church communion is habitually given, as it never was in the primitive Church, before Confirmation.

But developments have affected not only the intimate association of Confirmation with Baptism, but also both the " matter " (to use a technical word) and the ministrant of the sacrament itself.

In the New Testament, Confirmation is described in terms of the laying on of hands, and "laying on of hands" remained the definition of the rite throughout primitive times in the Western Church. But anointing, or "chrism," was from remote, perhaps even from apostolic,* days a supplementary part of the rite; and what was at first only a supplement became in the Eastern Church, as early as the third or fourth century, the essential and even the only "matter" of the sacrament. In time, too, though very much later, the Roman Church followed suit on the same lines, so that the apostolic "matter" of Confirmation survives only among ourselves and some Lutheran bodies; while on the other hand we have to our loss dropped the significant and it may be original accompaniment of the unction.

Lastly, the minister of Confirmation was in the New Testament the Apostle, and in early post-apostolic generations the bishop. But the Greek Church, when the laying on of hands fell out, transferred also the ministration of the rite from bishops to presbyters, though the bishop's authority over the sacrament has been so far retained that the chrism is always consecrated by the bishop. The Western Church has in practice reserved the administration of Confirmation to the bishop, though Gregory the Great allowed presbyters by delegation to confirm in Sardinia, and in general the Roman theory is that presbyters can (though I presume only by Papal authority) be commissioned to confirm.† But in the primitive view the laying on of hands over the Christian people in Confirmation was as naturally reserved to the Apostle or bishop as the laying on of hands over Christian ministers in Ordination: the Gift of the Spirit was one and the same, notwithstanding the diversities of *χαρίσματα* in its purpose and application. It can be no small cause for gratitude that this apostolic tradition, which alone gives full meaning and dignity to the Sacrament of Confirmation, survives among ourselves.

Certainly, even where the rite and the ministrant have been altered, no one would wish to deny the reality of the sacrament. Because the intention to perform the apostolic rite has been present all along, and because the development has been spread over a large area of Christian Churches and over long generations of Christian life, we cannot disallow the things done, however much we may regret them. Christian charity must always,

* *χρίσμα ἔχετε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου* (1 John ii. 20), and Westcott's note. *Cf.* 2 Cor. i. 21, 22, *ὁ δὲ βεβαιῶν ἡμᾶς σὺν ὑμῖν καὶ χρίσας ἡμᾶς Θεός, ὁ καὶ σφραγισάμενος ἡμᾶς καὶ δοὺς τὸν ἀρραβῶνα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν.*

† Was not the Roman Church in these developments really deferring to the example of the Greek Church? There were times when Byzantine influence was strong in Rome, and Westerns occasionally had an uneasy feeling that the Greeks had over themselves the advantage of superior antiquity and greater nearness to the original tradition; though in fact it was the Greeks in this case who had diverged from it.

where possible, take the wider view. Nevertheless, the presumptive conclusion to be drawn from the present instance is that developments are not necessarily improvements, and may be due as much to carelessness in guarding the Christian inheritance as to any more high-sounding reason.

2. My second illustration I take from the burning topic of the ministry of women.

From the first Christianity proclaimed the complete spiritual equality of men and women, their identical right to enter by baptism into membership of the Christian Society, their one participation in the gift of the Spirit and the fellowship of the Eucharist, their common title to citizenship here and hereafter in the Kingdom of Christ. But more than this: in the intercessions of the Widows on the Church's roll, in the self-dedication of the Virgins to the unmarried state, in the active ministration of the Deaconesses, provision was made for special types of the religious life and work of women.

This was much; and it went far beyond anything that paganism or even Judaism had conceived. Yet on the other hand, from the time of our Lord and the Apostles onward, there was a clear distinction drawn, and the ministry open to women was the ministry of service and not the ministry of office, the serving of the needs of the members of Christ and not the preaching of the Gospel. Women were among our Lord's nearest and closest followers, they ministered to Him of their substance and doubtless cared for His bodily wants, but He did not send them out among the Seventy or choose them among the Apostles.

The middle path of the Christian Church in this matter remained in marked contrast alike to the inequalities fostered by paganism on the one side, and to the licence allowed by pseudo-Christians on the other. Marcus Aurelius the Emperor is for us the finished type of ascetic goodness on the basis of philosophy: and Marcus looks out on life in the capacity of "a male and a Roman,"* whereas in Christ we know that there is neither Roman nor barbarian, neither male nor female. Conversely, heretical sects, and some that were not strictly heretical, permitted and encouraged a ministry of women: Montanists had official prophetesses, Marcionites had female ministers, and it is suggested that in this they were but developing on their own account the principles of Christian liberty. Even if they were before their time, may they not (it is asked) rank as examples of that fourth test of Newman's which he calls "early anticipation," and have prematurely foreshadowed a movement which is now rightly coming to its own ?

* *Meditations* ii. 5, ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἀρρήν.

Any such interpretation of the facts, however seductive at first sight, falls to the ground when we recognize the filiation of Montanist prophecy from Phrygian paganism, and remember the energizing in Gnostic thought of a principle fundamentally antagonistic to Christianity. All Gnostics, in whatever else they differed, agreed in regarding the material world around us as essentially evil. Christianity was a religion compatible with the ordered progress of human society, Marcionism was an anti-social religion in its rejection of marriage. Religions of this latter type encourage the emergence of woman in the public sphere, just because they sweep away her true pre-eminence in family life—whether, like the Montanists, they only exaggerate the ascetic element, or, like the Marcionites, exalt it into the dominant principle of their theology.

There is then a strong presumption against accepting any development which runs counter to the constant tradition and interpretation of the Church. On the other hand, development, however carefully it needs to be watched and guarded, cannot be ruled out (we have seen) as such ; still less can we draw any dividing-line and say that development was legitimate down to a certain date, but is not legitimate now. The work of the Spirit in the Body was not brought to an end when the Creed was formulated, nor even when the external unity of the Church was shattered. No doubt it is not so simple on our Anglican theory as it is on the Roman to find easy room for development, and indeed it may be just as well that it is not. But it has been a weakness of the Anglican position, both as against Rome and as against modernism, that it has sometimes seemed to fix a rigid limit of time and to treat the Church down to that particular moment as a living organism, creating and developing the equipment appropriate for its life, but after that moment as a perfectly equipped machine which has nothing more to do than to travel on indefinitely in the grooves to which it has been fitted. The life of the Spirit-bearing Body cannot be so confined. We may, indeed, believe that what has once been forged with blood and tears, like the faith of Nicæa, is κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί, an acquired possession of which nothing can rob us. But somewhere in our theology we must find room for the possibility of development ; and we cannot be sure that development, in the generations to come, may not lead us in unexpected directions. Sixty or seventy years ago no one would have guessed how far a silent revolution in our doctrine of final things would affect us. Yet this has not been among ourselves alone, nor does it lead entirely away from the tradition of the early Church. Still wider in its working throughout Western Europe is the movement that threatens to reverse the oldest

and greatest of all developments which Christianity has experienced in its contact with the world. Sixteen centuries have passed since Constantine and the ecclesiastics of his court inaugurated their fatal alliance between Church and State. Will the elder among us live to witness the reversal of a policy so far-reaching and of such long standing, and see realized in England the vision of *Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato?*

Dies docebit about that and other things. But there are, I am sure, enough changes which would bring things into nearer accord with the ideals of the Prophet of Nazareth and His first followers to satisfy the impulses of the most revolutionary among us. Developments may be for the better or for the worse; and if they seem to lead us away from the example of Christ and the teaching of His Church in the days when its inspiration was still fresh, we may at least claim that they must be first submitted to a searching test of time.

C. H. Turner.

THE GROUP MIND OF THE CHURCH

The study of Social Science has resulted in the discovery of the "Group Mind." A crowd, an army, a nation, is not a mere collection of separate individuals. It has an individuality, a quasi-personality of its own, embracing all the individuals of which it is composed, drawing from them their personal characteristics, and combining them in a unity which is greater than the mere sum of them. The crowd will do things which the individuals composing it blush to remember; the army performs deeds of heroism of which the soldier would be incapable, apart from his comrades. And as to a nation, Dr. McDougall, in his study of the "Group Mind," maintains that "a society when it enjoys a long life, and becomes highly organized, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief while in its life. It becomes an organized system of forces which has a life of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system, subject only to slow and gradual change."

In this gradual change of the society dominated by the Group Mind we trace progress or deterioration, as the case may be. The movement of social life runs along two distinct lines, moral and intellectual, and is conditioned in both by the innate and acquired characteristics of the race. Man's innate qualities, of course, descend from parent to child. Opinion, on the whole, is opposed to the view that it is so

with acquired characteristics also. The innate superiority, moral and intellectual, of the modern man over his ancestor of the Stone Age is generally denied. He is simply the inheritor of a far richer tradition. As Bishop Lightfoot puts it in one of his sermons: He is the little boy perched on his father's shoulders who says that he is the tallest person in the room.

It would appear, therefore, that man has certain innate moral and intellectual qualities which have remained stationary throughout the course of the development of human life. The intellectual qualities have, presumably, their seat in the brain, and their primary function is to enable the individual to make good his position in the general stream of life. The seat of the moral qualities cannot be so distinctly located, but their function seems to be the preservation, welfare, and development of the race as distinct from that of the individual considered apart from it. It is quite true that the individual may, and indeed to a large extent must, place his intellectual powers at the service of the race. In so far as he must, it is because his reason tells him that only by a system of give and take with his fellows can he attain the primary object which his intellect subserves—the establishment of his personal position in life. If he goes beyond this, and places his intellectual powers unselfishly at the service of others, it is because the moral side of his nature is predominant over the purely intellectual. From the purely intellectual point of view such action is foolishness. Mrs. Mona Caird, in an article quoted by Dr. Benjamin Kidd (*Social Evolution*) remarks that "there is something pathetically absurd in this sacrifice to their children of generation after generation of grown people." There speaks the intellect, resting on rational sanctions, in opposition to the moral nature, whose sanctions are of a different, though not necessarily of a contradictory, character. Dr. Kidd calls them ultra-rational sanctions. They consist of facts of a higher order than reason unaided can attain to, for they are beyond the sense impressions from which reason starts its operations. They are often embroidered and misinterpreted by man's imagination, and in so far as this is the case they are open to the correction of reason, but apart from them the altruistic instinct which lies at the root of morality is an utterly unaccountable phenomenon; and as a matter of history, the rejection of them, in whole or in part, has inevitably been followed, sooner or later, by the weakening or rejection of the moral tradition up to that moment unquestioned. They are the subject-matter of our religions: truths, as we believe, revealed to us by the Spirit Source of all existence, Whom we call God. A progressive moral

tradition corresponds either to a progressive revelation of such truths or to a progressive apprehension of their contents.

Dr. McDougall attributes no very high function to religion. It is "to preserve intact the current moral code, and to secure conformity to it." Religion, according to him, is always more or less prohibitive of progress. His hope for the future lies not in the attainment by mankind of the fulness of religious truth and power, with the consequent perfection of the moral life, but in the complete development of the intellectual tradition. "Not by any voluntary surrender of the reason, not by any subjugation of the intellect to the dominion of obscure transcendental ideas . . . but by a more strenuous use of our intellectual faculties, and by the growth of knowledge, especially a knowledge of the laws of human societies, will the stability and further evolution of nations be maintained." This seems to imply that the intellectual faculties, essentially individualistic, are to dominate those which are altruistic and moral. To many thinkers the prospect which such a process holds out is not of the stability and further evolution of human society, whether national or international, but its destruction; and this for the reason given by McDougall himself, that "the free play of the intellect [which presumably means the intellect untrammelled by moral considerations] is always a danger to society, for the reason that the customs and moral code of a society, however imperfect, and sanctioned by a religion however narrow, are yet the bonds by which alone it can be held together." Not that religion and intellect are to be set over against each other as irreconcilable opposites. No doubt a perfectly true religion, and a perfectly equipped and enlightened intellect, would meet in harmony. But they approach the problem of human life from opposite sides—the one altruistic, the other individualistic. In our imperfect state it is not surprising that they often seem to reach conclusions apparently inconsistent with each other. The perfect religion would be the sanction and justification of the perfect morality; and the perfect intellect would embrace those truths which to us at present are ultra-rational. The individual mind would attain its perfect satisfaction and complete enlightenment as a limited expression of the perfect Group Mind, the perfect realization of the moral and religious ideal. For the Group Mind, even in its imperfect manifestations in the crowd, the army, and the nation, clearly belongs to the moral rather than to the intellectual side of human nature. It upholds an ideal which is never simply that of ministering to the selfish gratification of its individual members. There is always the purpose of at least sharing the expected gain with others.

In its higher forms the Group Mind frequently demands and obtains the complete surrender of individual interests, as when a soldier sacrifices himself on the field of battle. And as an outcome of the moral tradition, it at least implicitly rests on religious sanctions.

For indeed religion has a far more important function than that assigned to it by Dr. McDougall. Every fresh religious truth, discovered or revealed, is a fresh illumination and test of the current moral tradition, establishing, correcting, supplementing it, as the case may be; certainly altering it, although generally not without a prolonged resistance of ingrained habits. New religious principles are often widely accepted, while yet their practical application is strenuously resisted. Dr. Kidd sees this process at work pre-eminently in the acceptance of the Christian religion by the Western nations. There was the long period when the principles of the Christian Faith had no very perceptible influence upon social life. For that reason McDougall denies it any great share in the formation of the Western moral tradition. But, as Karl Federn remarks in his *Dante and his Times*, "These principles were continually disregarded and violated in the Middle Ages, and not least by the Church herself; but then, the explanation of this lies in the fact that the wild and brutal men of those times were wholly incapable of fully understanding these doctrines, and much less of practising them in earnest. . . . How could the purity of the early times be preserved? How could it be attained when the wild German warriors, in whose souls the ferocious, warlike spirit of the race fought fiercely with the new doctrine, accepted it? Their whole life became a continual convulsion, a constant wavering now to this side, now to that; and of the same men the most frightful cruelties are reported, as well as moments of devoted ardour and meekest humility." Then came the Renaissance, and the Reformation following it. To the Reformation Kidd traces, with considerable exaggeration, the moral development of modern times, and finds it wholly admirable. It was, in fact, a revolt of intellectualism against authority, and yet it was not prepared entirely to abandon authority, and to take its stand upon solely rational sanctions. It appealed in some quarters to the Church of the first century —*i.e.*, to the Scriptures alone; in others, as in England, to the Church of the first six centuries—*i.e.*, to the Scriptures as interpreted by antiquity. In so far as its criticism of the Church of its day succeeded in showing that in part she had corrupted her message, in part suppressed it, the Reformation did good service. Especially by requiring that Scripture and the Church Services should be rendered in the vernacular,

it laid renewed emphasis on the fundamental Christian truth of the essential equality of all souls in God's sight; which now began to be taken as a working principle in social life, and has, as Kidd says, resulted in an unprecedented advance of the moral tradition. But there were also grievous losses. Rationalism, admitting certain alleged ultra-rational sanctions, assailed others, and in some cases successfully, proving them to be, not ultra-, but ir-rational. The process went on under various political and social conditions, with the result of what appears to be a hopelessly divided Christendom, the evils of which we are experiencing to-day. To it must be ascribed the alienation of vast masses from the Christian Faith—*i.e.*, from the ultra-rational sanctions of the Christian moral tradition. Unless these wanderers can discover, or have revealed to them, fresh and better sanctions, or, failing that, return to those they have discarded, morality must go by the board, and civilization founder. The search for fresh sanctions has so far yielded no very promising results. The only hope would seem to lie in a return to the old.

And yet a return either to the Reformation or the medieval standpoint seems unthinkable. The one would retain the causes which have produced the evil; the other would revive the state of things against which the Reformation was so largely a justifiable protest. We must go back beyond the divisions of the Reformation, but it must be to a Church whose authority is seen to rest on a more intelligible basis, and to function in a more vital and less mechanical way, than was supposed to be the case in the Church of the Middle Ages.

We have seen how Dr. McDougall denies any improvement of innate moral qualities, as much as he denies intellectual. All he concedes is evolution of the moral tradition. And surely he is right in this. The "natural man" is what he ever was. Yet the progress of the race is something more than the enrichment of the moral tradition. Kidd's contention that the Christian religion has been the foundation of the special type of altruism which distinguishes Western civilization, although attacked by McDougall, has not, I think, been disproved. This religion was certainly not adopted because of its congeniality to the innate qualities, whether moral or intellectual, of the Western nations. It was dead opposed to them. It had a tremendous fight with them all through the medieval period. The Church which embodied it was not uninjured in the conflict. The Renaissance meant going back to the old title-deeds of the Church, the Holy Scriptures, and a critical treatment, at first of their interpretation, afterwards of their text. The Reformation which resulted was in part

a reaffirmation, in part a misinterpretation, of them. The altruism belonged to the reaffirmation, the anarchy to the misinterpretation.

Altruism must inevitably at last seek refuge from anarchy in authority. That authority cannot be found if Christianity is nothing more than a development of the moral tradition.

But Christianity from the first professed to be something far greater. It asserted itself as a new, and primarily a social, life. From the first the Saints have been in evidence, and their difference from others has just been the new life moulding the moral tradition, and gradually commending it to a reluctant world. The partial reception of the moral tradition is not *per se* the reception of the new life; wherever that is found in action, there is more than an improved moral tradition: there is a passion for righteousness, and for something called holiness, which is infinitely stronger and warmer than tradition. It is a new Group Mind striving to make good in society, through first making good in individuals; and the definition of it is found in St. John's Gospel, in St. Paul's Epistles, in the Holy Eucharist—the central act of Christian worship—and in the patristic teaching gathered round it. It is Christ proclaimed as the Life of His Church.

It may be objected that both in the Johannine and in the Eucharistic teaching our Lord is represented rather as the life of the individual than as that of the Church. No doubt; but while this may be accounted for by the immediate practical aim of the teaching, it is impossible to suppose that the Johannine, the latest contribution to the Canonical Scriptures, regarded the life of the believer as something apart from the general life of the Church; and the jealous restriction of the Eucharist to those who remained in her communion implies the same thing. Our Lord is the Life of the Church, and therefore of the individual member. Nor does the doctrine of the Holy Spirit invalidate this teaching. "John of Damascus," remarks Professor Swete in his *Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, "fairly represents the wide outlook of the great Greek theologians. The cosmic work of the Spirit is recognized, as well as His work in the economy of human salvation; and in regard to the latter, justice is done to the profound view that saw in the Incarnation nothing less than a divine scheme for the 'deifying' of human nature—the restoration of man to the image and likeness of God, which is mirrored in the Incarnate Son, and which the Spirit of the Son reproduces in the regenerate life of His Body." This teaching, implicit along Johannine and Eucharistic lines of thought, is explicit in St. Paul, the earliest of Christian writers. Two of his epistles

set forth the local Church, one—that to the Ephesians—the Universal Church, as THE BODY OF CHRIST.

A body may be either a physical organism, of which the various portions mechanically obey the direction of the living mind; or it may be a social body, the unity of which consists in the submission, voluntary or coercive, of the living minds of the members to an ideal, a stimulus, a control emanating from the Group Mind. The Church is clearly of the latter class. It possesses all the characteristics noted by McDougall as belonging to such bodies. In particular, the power of raising the conduct of its members, especially in crises, above the normal level is in no other body so strikingly exhibited. Nevertheless, in one fundamental particular the group life of the Church is unique. That of an army or a nation is something developed out of the group, and, were the group dissipated, would automatically cease to exist. The Life of the Church first appears as an individual Life, inspiring a physical Body. Only through self-sacrifice unto physical death does It pass into a higher stage of existence, from which It gives Itself to be the living Group Mind of the Church. It is not developed from below; It is given from above by the operation of the Holy Spirit, Who conveys It. But when It reaches the Church, It has to subdue to Itself the individual minds of the members, and that not by coercion, but by persuasion. The powers of evil have waged a stubborn war against this process, and the divisions of Christendom have dimmed almost to extinction in many quarters the very consciousness of its character as a divine Group Mind striving to draw within its controlling influence the wills, the affections, and the intellects of all "who profess and call themselves Christians." It promises the perfect satisfaction of all these elements of human nature, and points back through the ages to an individual Life in Which they found their satisfaction; but human nature takes very long to combine into the perfect Group Life.

The final stage, the "divine, far-off event," in the history of the Church would seem to be the manifestation of a perfect moral tradition, not indeed innate, as that word is usually understood—that is, not inherited through natural generation—and yet not simply acquired, but in a sense innate through the new birth of Water and of the Spirit. This tradition, embracing a mode of group life, will possess an outward visible form to express it, and an inward spiritual power, which will make it no dead code, but a living force, by its intrinsic magnetism (so to speak) drawing wills, affections, intellects, into harmony with itself.

Some such group life the world, with its Boards of Conciliation and its League of Nations, is blindly endeavouring to evolve. The spectacle it presents at the present moment is that of many peoples deeply conscious that social life is far from perfect, and struggling to reach their unattained ideals; some willing to destroy all that has been hitherto won, and to start afresh from the beginning; some anxious to conserve what has been already gained, and by various expedients, political, eugenic, etc., purge it of its imperfections. It seems as if every path is destined to be explored which even looks as if it might possibly lead to perfection, before men wearily turn to take the gift so long held out to them. Only when they have convinced themselves, by mournful experience, that what they desire cannot be developed from below, will they have so far advanced as to be willing to receive it from above.

And yet the social experiments are anything but valueless. Men must develop from below in order to receive from above. If history has any lesson for us, it is that every form of spiritual power has to await its "fullness of time" for acceptance. Events lead up to it; premonitions of the wise put men on the outlook for it; the powder train is laid—it only awaits the spark. But that spark it cannot create. And nature tells the same tale. Matter must have reached an unique degree of sensitiveness when life entered into it and it became an organism; the living creature which first became conscious must have been the most highly organized of the then existing species; and the first being into whose brain there floated the glory of spiritual vision must have been, the moment before, the king of those we call the lower animals. And the general trend of events by which one nation was prepared, through much experience of failure and disillusionment, for the lofty, monotheistic Faith of Judaism, and ultimately to be the starting-point of the world's redemption, no critical treatment of the books of the Old Testament can ever obscure. It seems, indeed, as if this world of ours were swimming in an infinite ocean of divine grace, wherein first one part and then another opens out to receive this or that element of the wondrous whole. God does not suddenly resolve to give; man becomes slowly fitted to receive. Perhaps only by comparison with all possible earthly approximations in group life will the human race be furnished with the knowledge and the sense of pressing need strong enough to stimulate the general will to accept that perfect Group Life so long manifested and offered to us, the Life of the Incarnate Christ energizing in the Church, and from the Church reaching out to draw all men—nay, all life—unto Itself.

C. E. Scott Moncrieff.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

More than once during last year the South African Alternative Liturgy was alluded to in these columns (*cf.* Theology, Vol. II., pp. 161*ff*, 208).

At the Episcopal Synod, held in November, 1921, and reported in the *Church Chronicle* dated December 1, 1921, the Bishops of the Province passed an Act revising the Alternative Liturgy by the excision of certain phrases which proved occasion of difficulty to many. "A widely-signed Memorial (they say) makes it clear that, if the phrases 'these sacred gifts and creatures of Thine Own' and 'that He may hallow this oblation and' were removed from the Prayer of Consecration, the alternative form would be generally accepted, and, as a result, would be more widely used, and thus tested"; and they decide, therefore, on the excision of the phrases referred to. The result of the excision is still to leave "the Memorial of the Holy Ghost in its normal position in the orderly sequence of the Canon," while avoiding a consecratory epiclesis.

The spirit in which both Bishops and clergy have approached and handled their task makes one hope that a similar charity and goodwill may prevail when the question is taken up nearer home.

We have received the following note concerning "The National Movement towards a Christian Order of Industry and Commerce." We gather that other movements with similar aims and on equally large lines are already in contemplation.

Christian Principles in Business.

Can Christian principles be applied to business? is a question being asked widely to-day. When we find that an affirmative answer is being given by men engaged in big business like Viscount Hambleden, Mr. Seebohm and Mr. Arnold Rowntree, and Mr. Angus Watson, one feels that the question is much more than an academic one. These gentlemen are the Vice-Presidents of the National Movement towards a Christian Order of Industry and Commerce, which has now taken an office at 24, Great Russell Street, London, W.C. 1. Mr. Sydney W. Pascall is Chairman of the Movement, and Sir Richard V. Vassar-Smith (Chairman of Lloyds Bank) is Treasurer, and the Council includes people drawn from such diverse walks of life as the wire industry, furniture-making, the wool trade, pottery, publishing, paper-making, confectionery, building, banking, education, and sausage-making. The names of Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. W. E. F. Macmillan, Miss Audrey Wedgwood, Miss M. J. Powell, Mr. George Garnett of Bradford, and Dr. Ernest Barker of King's College, London, will be noted. The defined aim of the Movement is "to rally men and women of goodwill engaged in the administration of industry, commerce, and the professions for the application of Christian principles to industrial, commercial, and professional life."

PAPERS FOR THE PRIESTHOOD

A.—DEVOTION

By Rev. W. B. Trevelyan, formerly Warden of Liddon House

IX.

An attempt has been made in these brief papers to consider certain aspects of prayer in their bearing on the life of a priest. The subject is so deep and wide that, at best, only a fragment of it could be considered.

We have, however, seen that for a priest, whatever the nature of his work may be, prayer is essential. "Walk before Me," said God to Abraham, "and be thou perfect"; and a priest can accept no lower standard than this. If he is not, like Abraham, "the friend of God," he will never bring others to know or love Him.

Yet those of us who know practically what the daily demands on the time of a parish priest are, know also how great is the strain involved in maintaining so high an ideal. There are parishes in which, often (though not always) by no fault of his own, a priest's life is one long series of what we call "interruptions." Nothing can in such circumstances save a man from ineffectiveness, or perhaps from serious lapses, if he does not constantly strive to live near God; and that is impossible without prayer. But prayer demands real effort, and indeed not seldom necessitates the seeming neglect of outside calls as less essential.

Further, one of the chief demands made upon a priest by his people will, as time goes on, be for guidance in this matter of prayer. "The priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth." His Offices, his Mass, his daily morning and evening prayers, his meditations, his intercessions—none of these can be lightly or without loss omitted. If he is to advise others in their difficulties, his own inner life must be right; otherwise vision, sympathy, joy, disappear, and in all probability "the hungry sheep look up and are not fed."

Many will remember the description in Walter Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* of the life of the early Christians: "Some transfiguring spirit was at work . . . begetting a unique effect of freshness, of grave yet wholesome beauty, because the world of sense, the whole outward world, was understood to set forth the veritable unction and reality of a certain priesthood and kingship of the soul within, amongst the prerogatives of which was a delightful sense of freedom."

Perhaps it is just this that we need to-day. It may be the case that if there were more of this about us—this result of a vivid sense of nearness to God and of the Divine indwelling—we should attract others more to Him. Perhaps our religion to-day is a little matter-of-fact, formal, suburban, parochial. If there were more of the spirit of St. Paul's converts in us ("Speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs; singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord"), we might satisfy and refresh, more than we do, those who are seeking rest and peace in a very drab, difficult, and anxious world. Possibly, a little more mystery and depth of a healthy kind, such as would follow from a keener sense of these inward things, would make a real difference.

It is impossible not to feel that this is sometimes seriously lacking in our manner of administering the Sacraments; we miss that subtle atmosphere that faith, hope, and love create, which would bring joy and peace to many who need our help.

Space permits of no more enlargement upon this subject, but a few concluding remarks may be permissible.

1. We shall always be safe "in looking away" (ἀφορῶντες—Heb. xii. 2) from self, in taking refuge in adoration, thanksgiving, and the like. Probably few of us realize how lacking we are in these, even at the time of Eucharistic worship. Too seldom do we "direct our prayer" unto Him "and look up."

2. We cannot pray acceptably without the aid of the Holy Spirit; still less can we attain to the use of deeper and more mystical prayer. We may, for our comfort, more often call to mind St. Paul's words in Romans viii. 26 *ff.* Dr. Swete, commenting on the passage, says: "There are times when we cannot pray in words, or pray as we ought; but our inarticulate longings for a better life are the Spirit's intercession on our behalf, audible to God, Who searches all hearts, and intelligible and acceptable to Him since they are the voice of His Spirit" (*The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, pp. 220–221).

3. We must accept times of aridity and dryness as normal and inevitable, as being part of the "rhythm" of life. They have been the lot of the saints in all ages. If we were without them, if our spiritual life was one unbroken experience of sunshine, we should have real cause for anxiety. After all, God is seeking us, and "the darkness is no darkness" with Him: to Him "the darkness and light are both alike."

4. We must avoid any unhealthy monotony. A well-known writer on the spiritual life said recently that we ought to be receptive, ready to accept fresh indications of God's Will and revelations of His Nature. God changes as to what He asks of us; not always does He expect the same kind of prayer. Monotony, therefore, negates the whole meaning of our relation to God. We must ever be seeking to learn, both for ourselves and for others, what new service He is asking.

Perhaps one more quotation may be allowed, from Walter Hilton (*Scale of Perfection*, Art and Book Co., 1901, p. 132): "If there be any word herein that stirreth thee or comforteth thee more to the love of God, thank God, for it is His gift and not of the words written. And if it comforteth thee not, and thou understandest it not readily, study not too long about it, but lay it aside till another time, and go to thy prayers or some other business; take it as it will come and not all at once."

B.—IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the enquiry to an expert; a number of

well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

VIII.—OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

The ordinary priest is orthodox in his attitude towards the Old Testament. But there are two orthodoxies, an old and a new. The old makes a few inevitable concessions to criticism, such as the symbolical character of the early chapters of Genesis, and then girds at a class of dangerous men, disturbers of religious peace, whom it calls "the critics." It is amply justified in suspecting processes which result in the Old Testament's ceasing to be regarded as a record of revelation in any real sense, but the comprehensive designation "the critics" is most unfortunate. A term of praise is diverted to become one of opprobrium. For we are all critics, or, if not, we ought to be. A critic is nothing more or less than one who uses *judgment* in his study of Scripture. Ask to see the Bible of a pious bedridden cottager. It will be surprising if Isaiah and the Psalms are not well-worn while Leviticus and Esther show little or no signs of use. Unconsciously he has been exercising the art of criticism. The religious teacher has many duties which do not concern our cottager, but the primary element in criticism—thinking for oneself—is common to both.

The new orthodoxy is less respectable than the old. Twenty years ago its exponent studied one or two textbooks for examination purposes. They represented the researches of a period ending ten years before. Since college days he has read nothing more on the subject, which does not interest him much. But he has taken it all on trust, swallowing J, E, D, H, and P whole in simple faith. Such a man may well justify himself by saying that the general lines of critical investigation are fixed and even in a generation have not altered much. But he cannot claim to be in any sense in touch with modern thought; he has merely taken a new orthodoxy in exchange for an old. Contemporary criticism of the Old Testament is not disposed to take for granted the results of the nineteenth-century workers, from which it seems to be departing in two directions. One school of thought, impressed by archæological evidence, is returning to more conservative positions. Another presses to ever more radical scepticism and the dating of large parts of the Old Testament in Maccabæan times.

The old orthodoxy is, in my opinion, really dangerous just now, for two reasons. In the first place, it is based rather on prejudice than knowledge, a prejudice strongly reinforced by anti-German feeling. As the feelings engendered by the War slowly wear away, those who continue to nourish the prejudices based on them are likely to become discredited. Secondly, the great educational movement goes on its way independently of the Church. As regards the Old Testament, teachers have made up their minds. The textbooks used in Secondary Schools accept the critical position, and the young people in our congregations trained in this way have none of the susceptibilities which we had to consider in their predecessors. We might almost say that the position is reversed, and that sermons based upon the old orthodoxy may cause them to stumble.

Many a Churchman would have no scruple about accepting the conclusions of moderate criticism with regard to the Old Testament if it were not for the knowledge that the same methods applied to the New Testament lead to results which he knows to be wrong. It is wholly illogical to accept criticism in the one case and reject it in the other. "Look where it leads" is an argument against going any part of the way.

It may help such a man to be pointed to a brilliant chapter in the late Professor Morris Jastrow's book on Ecclesiastes entitled *A Gentle Cynic*. The writer is dealing with critical presuppositions, and shows that the modern European idea of authorship is inapplicable to the Old Testament. Authorship in our sense began with the flourishing period of Greek literature. In the ancient East composite authorship was the rule. All Babylonian literature is anonymous. Babylonian and Assyrian clay tablets are numbered successively, the first word of Tablet One describing the series. Similarly in Hebrew literature: our Genesis is entitled *Bereshith* ("In the beginning"), and Exodus *Shemoth* ("Names"), after the first word of each. Hebrew had no word for "author," only *Sofer*, "a scribe." In Old Testament times the spoken, not the written, word was all-important. Footnotes and quotation marks had not been invented. Plagiarism was a compliment, not a crime. The Old Testament books are in line with Homer, not with Sophocles. They were living things, which grew with use and time. The Oberammergau Passion Play is the best example of such literature in the modern world.

If this be so—and Professor Jastrow speaks with authority—then many of our discussions about authorship are irrelevant. A book like Isaiah contains reports of the prophet's utterances, and much else in harmony with the master's spirit. The responsibility is corporate rather than individual, but to call the whole by the name of Isaiah was the natural course.

Note, however, that this argument does not extend to the New Testament, which is a collection of Greek books made at a time when the modern conception of authorship and literary honesty had emerged.

D.—CIVIC RELATIONS OF THE MINISTRY

By Miss A. Deane, O.B.E.

VIII.—HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW ABOUT LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

In view of the fact that the County Council Elections throughout the country will be upon us the first week in March, it will be useful to consider points of interest in connection with Local Government.

England and Wales are divided into administrative areas called Counties and County Boroughs. Every County must have a County Council, and this body is an elected body, members being elected every three years. When the election is over the Councillors elect their own Chairman, and they also elect, either from their own number or from specially qualified people outside, a certain number of Aldermen—these may be one-sixth of their number. Aldermen serve for six years, only half their number retire every three years.

It is important to note who may vote at County Council Elections. In boroughs, there exists what is called the "Burgess Roll," a register

of men and women, and nobody may vote who is not registered. In the County Divisions (the County is divided into Constituencies) every man or woman over twenty-one years of age who has occupied for a year preceding July 15th a house, shop, or other building rated for poor relief within a parish of the County may vote, provided they are not in receipt of poor relief themselves, and have paid their rates up to date; also anybody may vote who has property up to the annual value of £10, but must be able to prove residence in the parish for the same length of time as the other voters.

People who may be elected as County Councillors are:

1. Those who are duly enrolled as electors for the County—men or women.

2. Those who, residing more than seven miles from, but within fifteen miles of, the County, but who possess property in the County to the value of £1,000 or are rated to the poor rate of the County to the annual value of £30.

3. Those who have a Parliamentary vote for property owned in the County.

4. Peers owning property in the County.

The Chairman of the County Council is not of necessity an existing Councillor or Alderman. He may be elected from outside, and the office is very often held for a long time by the same person.

The powers of the County Council are very wide, and their work so great that it is practically all carried on by Committees, which deal with Finance, Education, Agricultural Questions, Small Holdings and Allotments, Public Health and Housing, Police, etc. Under the County Council the work is further localized by dividing the County area up into districts and parishes, and parishes in some cases into wards: it authorizes parishes with over 300 inhabitants to elect Parish Councils; sometimes two or three small parishes are grouped under one parish council.

A County Council has very important financial power. It holds property, borrows money, levies rates, and administers grants received from the State. One of the important functions of the County Council is to preserve public rights-of-way, commons, and roadside land. It has to keep up all the main roads, but the upkeep of some roads may be the work of an Urban District Council, which has to find part of the money, the County Council paying the rest.

An interesting bit of work that a County Council carries out is that of satisfying the demand for allotments in the County, and also to secure small holdings. Land can be purchased for these by compulsion if necessary, and the Council can build houses upon them for the holders.

All questions of housing, water-supply, and sewerage are supervised by the County Council, which can compel the District Council to do its duty if there are signs that it is not carrying out its proper functions; it may compel the District Council to keep a house in good repair, with good water and sanitation.

The County Councils in England and Wales have done much in connection with the Developments Commission in the way of reclamation and draining of land, making light railways, harbour constructions, development of fisheries, etc.

There are many other matters with which the Council has full powers to deal, such as the granting of licences for theatres, music-halls, and race-courses; the appointing of the Public Analyst, who is responsible

for seeing that there is no adulteration of food and drugs. There are such questions as the protection of wild birds, the breeding and conserving of fish, the laws relating to such things as swine fever or foot-and-mouth disease, rabies, etc., which the County Council has to legislate about. It also works as part of a Joint Standing Committee with the Justices of the Peace in the County to manage the County Police, and, appointing the Chief Constable, co-operates with him and with the Home Office over the control of the Police Force in the area.

It would take too long to go into all the details of the work of Borough Councils, but it is necessary to understand the difference between a County Council, a Borough Council, and a Town Council.

There are some ancient cities which have the title of "a County of a City," Bristol and Exeter amongst them, and their Councils have all the powers of County Councils. But as a rule every city with over 50,000 inhabitants has its Borough Council; generally it is the same as the Municipal Borough and is known as the Town Council, and it is the elected representative body which governs all municipal affairs, and the chief officer of this body is the Mayor or Lord Mayor, as the case may be.

To those who are not living in a city there is often some confusion in the mind of electors as to the powers and duties of a District Council, and this can be either Urban or Rural. The District Council has to carry out for Local Government purposes what are known as sanitary matters, and it is well to remember that the Rural District is the same area as the Poor Law Union, and members of the Council combine the duties of Rural District Councillor with that of Poor Law Guardian. The work that these Councils have to carry out comprises the provision of drainage, sewerage, water-supply, inspection of all houses and factories in respect of sanitation, the inspection and prevention of nuisances, the removal of refuse from ashpits, etc., and the disposal of all refuse which is bad for health. There must be a supply of pure water to every house, and the Council has also to deal with the prevention of diseases and such questions as lighting of roads or open spaces, etc., baths, washhouses, and so forth. It is also the highway authority, and it has great powers in connection with housing.

A further local administrative body is the Parish Council, which must meet at least once a year, and is elected every three years, in April. It consists of parochial electors only, men and women who are entitled to a Parliamentary vote and to vote at County Council Elections. It consists of from five to fifteen members, the number determined by the County Council. This body, the Parish Council, appoints overseers of the poor; it also is given the provision and management of allotments to carry out, and many of its duties are like those of the District Council on a smaller scale.

It is essential that women should take their share in the work of Local Government; as yet comparatively few women are doing so. The work of a County Councillor is very exacting; people are so accustomed to law and order in the administration of local affairs, that they often forget that they owe it to the unfailing public spirit and devotion to duty which actuates a large number of the best men in all grades of society in the country, who devote long days and hours to splendid voluntary work ungrudgingly for the good of the community. Surely there exists no body of workers in the world to whom we should be more grateful than those who carry out the work of Local Government.

REVIEWS

EPILEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF GREEK RELIGION. By Jane Ellen Harrison, Hon. D.Litt., Hon. LL.D., Fellow and Lecturer of Newnham College, Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1921. 40 pp. 3s. 6d. net.

Anthropologists and students of comparative religion will be grateful to Dr. Jane Harrison for this summary of her researches in the origins of Greek religion, while the theologian will also find in it much that is full of interest and constructive criticism.

Starting with the basal thesis that the religious impulse is directed primarily to one end and one end only—the conservation and promotion of life—Dr. Harrison shows that primitive ritual was established to expel evil (barrenness and hunger) and secure good (food and fertility). This twofold aspect of ritual, negative and positive, for expulsion and impulsion, are but two faces of the same will, the "will to live." "It is all summed up in the old ritual formula: 'Out with Famine, in with Health and Wealth.' We analyze and distinguish, but at bottom is the one double-edged impulse, the impulse towards life." This view of religion as the means of conserving the common life, physical and spiritual, makes the conception of a god an important but non-essential by-product arising out of rites and sacrifices.

It is undoubtedly true that Tylor's theory that the "minimum definition of religion" is the belief in spiritual beings is too specialized to include all the data that can claim, from the scientific standpoint, to come under the title of religion. Similarly Frazer's definition of religion as "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct or control the course of nature and of human life," does not take into account that much that can justly be called religion is not propitiation, and that some objects recognized by religion are neither equal nor superior to man. When all the available evidence is collected, classified, and correlated, it would seem that the origin of religion must be sought in undifferentiated and incoherent impressions of the awful, the blend of fear, wonder, admiration, gratitude, and negative self-feeling. Doubtless at a very early period man began to evolve means to exploit, as well as theories to explain, the objects of his awful contemplation, and since apparently his two great interests were food and children, it may well be

that "the religious impulse" was directed primarily to one end—the conservation and promotion of life.

The evolution of the idea of a god was probably a more specialized conception than the notion of an impersonal force associated with the mysterious, but it has yet to be proved that "the Great Spirit is the synthesis of all the totems, and consequently a sort of presentation of the idea, or rather sentiment, of tribal unity," a product of initiation rites. Religion is undoubtedly social rather than individualistic in origin, and the institution of totemism (which is essentially an affirmation of group unity) belongs apparently to the primary phase of religious development. Together with tabu, the latter may have "given us in embryo our main religious conceptions, the idea of sanctity, of sacrament, of sin, of sacrifice, of animal and plant worship, of immortality and ancestor worship." But it is by no means certain that "the notions of tabu and sanctity became incarnate in a person—the king as incarnate tabu and magic is undoubtedly the father of the pagan god." This view is based on Frazer's theory that the king is the lineal successor through the priest of the medicine-man, religion and the priest taking the place of magic and the magician when the fallacy of trying to control the processes of nature became apparent to the acuter minds. The king, starting as a magician, gradually exchanged the practice of magic for the priestly functions of prayers and sacrifice. Dr. Harrison adds to this hypothesis a new element—that magic had already shaped an image which became a god when the magic rite failed. Thus the *daimon* stage of religious thought led to what she calls Olympianism. Here at last we have the god distinctly separated from man, segregated aloof from the worshipper, but made in the image of that worshipper, and so he must be approached by human means—prayer, praise, and sacrifice. This late and artificial stage Dr. Harrison regards as a setback because these man-begotten gods reflect the passions of their worshippers. "These projected 'Olympians,' though they are ideals, are by no means ideal, and not infrequently lag behind their worshippers in morality. Yahweh is even more unbridled, licentious, vengeful, than his people. The average Athenian would have been ashamed to emulate the amours of Zeus." However, this interesting theory of the evolution of theism has yet to be established. Frazer's hypothesis is the outcome of the false premise that magic everywhere preceded religion. The medicine man undoubtedly has much in common with the priest, but since he is often initiated by the tribal god or by spirits, it is difficult to believe that he represents an initial stage in the development of the con-

ception of a god. In fact, the existence of gods at all in Australia disproves the theory of an "age of magic" preceding an "age of religion." The primitive conception of god is that of "a magnified non-natural man." This goes back to a time long before the state was established, and probably before the medicine-man exercised his functions. Some gods may have developed from dæmons, divine kings, magicians, etc., but it does not follow that theism arose in this way.

Dr. Harrison concludes her interesting *Epilegomena* with a chapter on "The Religion of To-day." In her opinion, theology serves a useful purpose because "it aims at the bettering of life, by the exercise of the function of choice and the practice of asceticism." "Religion means to us now, at least to me, not cosmology, not a story told to account for how things are, not ritual or theology, the various projections of our own unsatisfied desire: religion means a way of life possible because we are not only animals but human animals." "Asceticism is the setting out of the soul towards the higher value," "the crucifixion of animal desires." This new religion substitutes values for truth. The external Creator, Father, and Saviour has become "the undying human memory, the increasing human will." The Immanent God is nothing but the mystery of the whole of things, and the function of modern religion is the realization of self within the limits of the community. "For the new Immanentist, creeds have become all but insignificant; they are to him not living expressions of truth apprehended, but ancient barriers, dams artificially built to stem the inrush of living waters. The whole centre of gravity has, in fact, shifted from authority to experience." In other words, religion is simply an activity of the human as opposed to the Divine Spirit, unrelated to any transcendent reality and entirely dissociated from the quest of truth. Is this the verdict of comparative religion? The history of religion is the record of a universal search after God by every tribe and race of men, "if haply they might feel after Him and find Him." Primitive ritual and belief is largely the product of "dream or phantasy-thinking," and is therefore more inclined to subjective impulses and wish fulfilment than to reality. A very considerable residue of primitive theology has survived the more scientific and accurate process of "directed thinking." This has to be cleared away if theological truth is to be established. The quest of truth need never be feared, but attempts to validate religion in the terms suggested in this volume are to be deprecated. It is inconceivable that reasonable beings will be induced to fashion their lives according to the principles of a fictitious system founded upon assumptions

which can lay no claim to historical truth or ultimate reality. When the reader puts down the *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, he may with advantage take up Dr. Gore's latest volume, *Belief in God*. E. O. James.

Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. By Baron Friedrich von Hügel, LL.D., D.D. J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London and Toronto. 1921. Pp. xx+308. 15s. net.

The present religious situation is complex and obscure, and hasty analysis of it has only led to inadequate treatment. It is impossible to ignore the difference made in man's thinking by Copernicus, and Newton, and Kant, and Darwin, or the transformation of ideals and spiritual outlook produced by the Renaissance. Between obscurantism, however pious, and sincere and enlightened modern thinkers there is a great gulf fixed. But because we are further from Calvin and Knox than from Dante and St. Francis, Protestantism is already *vieux jeu*. The Liberalism of Germany and the Modernism of France and Italy substitute the infallibility of the historian for that of the Pope or of the Bible; they are revealed to the learned and the sophisticated, and hidden from the babes. The only effective religious claim presented to the modern European man is that of Liberal Catholicism. It is a movement which has increased, is increasing, and will increase.

Liberal Catholicism shades off at one side into the Modernism of Loisy, and at the other side into the complacent obscurantism which identifies "liberal" with "well-read," and "catholicism" with "reaction"; every Catholic thinks that his own particular attitude is "liberal catholicism," in the true meaning of those words. Liberalism is sometimes the name of the negative spirit which dilutes the true religious spirit, minimizes dogma and explains it away, and ignores ecclesiastical authority; but there is another type of liberalism, "Liberal Catholicism" properly so called, which is very sensitive to the authority of the *consensus fidelium*, and recognizes that the value of such *consensus* depends on the responsibility and freedom of the faithful individual. It is the free allegiance of those whose minds and consciences are enlightened by the Holy Spirit which gives the voice of the Church the authority of Christ; "He that heareth you, heareth Me." Such liberalism is, to use the words of Lord Acton, "the beginning of real religion, a condition of interior Catholicism." And the other great qualification of Liberal Catholicism is that it is never content with the mere expression in theology or

cultus or organization of any truth of our holy religion; always it is concerned with the religious and moral value of the Creed, and its expression in prayer and morality, in the life of "charity," in the full meaning of that much minimized word.

This book is a collection of essays in a theology for Liberal Catholics. "Religion achieves its fullest power and balance only in the completest interaction of God, Christ, Church," Baron von Hügel holds; and each of the three sections of the book deals with a profound and obstinate difficulty associated with one of these great aspects of religion. The author's characteristic temper finds expression in a resolute refusal to ignore difficulties; not in a hasty discovery of new solutions, but in that deeper originality, content to appear derivative and docilely acceptive of tradition, and patient to appropriate as a personal inspiration the living spiritual meaning of the classical statements of the universal human experience of God's salvation in Christ to be found in the great masters of Catholic theology. The first section deals with Religion in General and Theism, and culminates in a touchingly beautiful and spiritually valuable paper on the burden of the existence of Evil in a God-governed world. This, we are reminded again and again, is inexplicable. But Christianity has done more than explain suffering and sin; it has immeasurably widened and deepened man's sensitiveness to these things, and has quickened and enriched the love in which men give themselves without reserve to redeem the world. In other words, it has revealed in action the Love which is God. The second section of the book is concerned with the Teaching of Jesus and Christianity in General, and makes explicit the great difficulty for faith involved in the undoubted fact that Jesus Himself taught the proximity of His second coming. This section leads up to a most interesting and provocative paper on "What do we mean by Heaven? and what do we mean by Hell?" The last four papers describe the difficulties for conscience and intellect involved in the existence and activity of the Church, and the conception of Catholicism generally, and especially the fact that institutional Christianity tends, apparently of necessity, to tyrannize over the non-religious activities of man. If Religion is to have its full richness of inspiration and control in the lives of men, it must be purified and deepened by contact and friction with philosophy and history and science and art and politics. Religion only becomes deeply and fully universal, richly Catholic, when it encourages men and women to pursue these activities by their own methods and for their own sakes, and believes that the absolute values so served will reveal more of God, and result in the enrichment

of religion itself. The most significant thing in this section is the elaboration of what Troeltsch derives from Aquinas, that the fundamental distinction defined by Christianity is not that between sin and redemption, but that between Nature and Supernature.

There are writers who are clear because they are shallow. Baron von Hügel is not one of these. He possesses vast learning, patience, prophetic insight, and the power to co-ordinate real religion with ripe culture. He will serve truth at whatever cost. No Catholic can claim to be fully equipped to serve this generation who has not come to terms with the work of which these essays are the latest instalment.

A. E. Baker.

Psychology and Mystical Experience. By John Howley, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Galway. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., London. 1921. 1 vol. Pp. 275. 10s. 6d. net.

This is a book written by a Roman Catholic Professor of Philosophy, which was originally designed as an article dealing with recent works on the psychology of religious experience. Our valuation of this work must necessarily depend on whether we judge it as a contribution to the literature of mystical experience, or as a contribution to the literature of psychology. Since it is always pleasanter to draw profit from a book than to find fault with it, we will consider it in the former aspect first.

The first chapter, on "The Psychology of a Retreat," deals with the value of the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola in the gradual development of the attitude of generosity towards God. He insists that reformation of life, and not training in mental prayer, was the primary object of the exercises.

The second part of the book consists of three chapters on mysticism. He stresses the distinction between mysticism and Quietism. It is probable that there is a very real distinction here, although it appears to the present reviewer that it is more adequately described as a cleavage which runs through all religions than as one which divides off Catholic mysticism from all other kinds of experience which resemble it. AlGhazzali, for example, has all the marks of a true mystic, while other Sufi writers seem to belong to the Quietist tradition. Professor Howley seems to mean that the distinction lies in the fact that in Quietism the dominant note is not the desire for a fuller life, but the longing to escape from conscious

existence. But this appears to apply only to the extremer forms of Quietism. A more valid distinction would seem to be between the persons to whom the preliminary ascesis is primarily a means of mental development, and those to whom it is primarily a means of making the soul ready for the Divine action. The former may be called Quietists, the latter mystics.

The author considers that mystical experience is the result of the imposition of the negative idea of God (the result of a process of abstraction pushed to the ultimate) on the mind already prepared by the preliminary ascetic training. Thus he opposes the view (suggested by Poulain and other writers) that it is of the nature of a perception of the presence of God, essentially different in kind from the feeling of the presence of God experienced at times by the ordinarily devout person. He also questions Paulain's sharp distinction between the non-mystical *prayer of simplicity* and the mystical *prayer of quiet*. He does not, of course, deny the existence of a metanoetic element in mystical experience, but suggests that it is continuous with the metanoetic element in the faith of the everyday Catholic. " We would then be able to trace out the progress of spiritual experience, from the conversion-psychose to ecstasy, as a continuous growth in faith, the stages being set by the degrees of charity attained by the soul " (p. 271).

This part of Professor Howley's book is of great value and interest, and is clearly written by a man with profound knowledge of his subject. It is of particular interest for members of the Church of England to meet with an authoritative Roman presentation of the subject, which is nevertheless so different from the classical treatment of it by Poulain.

In his excursions into modern psychology in his chapters on " The Theory of William James " and " The Psychology of a Revival," Professor Howley is less happy. It is rather late to take James and F. W. H. Myers as representatives of the *modern* theory of the subconscious. It is foolishly inaccurate to pretend that the subconscious is an invention of agnostic psychologists for the purpose of explaining away the phenomena of the religious life. The existence of the *subconscious* or the *unconscious* is a deduction from a vast number of observations in normal and abnormal psychology, and its application to the explanation of the psychological problems of religion is only incidental. Nothing could be much further from the modern psychologist's conception of the subconscious than Professor Howley's description of " another self hanging on to our phenomenal self like a psychic Siamese twin, sleeping perhaps most of the time, but clapper-clawing our conscious-

ness when awake! A second mind working in the dark and throwing out stray suggestions, yet so hidden that we have only sporadic evidence from which to infer its existence" (p. 77).

His own alternative for the theory of the subconscious as an explanation for conversion consists of two postulates: "the existence in our states of consciousness of certain centres of instability"; and "the psychic dynamism of nascent ideas." These do not seem to be very illuminating.

The weakness of the case of Roman Catholic writers on the psychology of religion against *medical materialism* lies in the fact that they themselves are always inclined to adopt the point of view of medical materialism when they are dealing with the phenomena of other forms of religion. For example when discussing the conversion of a farmer addicted to swearing, Professor Howley says that it was "a sort of aphasia affecting his *centres of profanity*" (p. 117). What would a medical materialist say to such an explanation as this?

The author would more easily win our sympathy in his combat with the agnostic psychologist if he argued with him more and sneered at him less. On p. 52 we read: "As to the success of the *Exercises* as a revival method, let the history of the Catholic Church speak. . . . But the psychologist who investigates the phenomena of religious experience, like William James, passes them by. He is blind to their results because their methods are ordinary. Quiet reforms of life with no subconscious Jack-in-the-box emergencies, are of little interest to the agnostic in quest of a dissolution of the universe." This is not philosophical controversy. It is merely an exhibition of bad manners.

ROBERT H. THOULESS, M.A.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE FLESH. By the Rev. J. T. Darragh, D.D., Rector Emeritus of St. Mary's, Johannesburg, South Africa. S.P.C.K. 1921. Pp. x+324. 18s.

This is in some respects a remarkable book. It is "the result of the life-study and experience of a busy parish priest." It hails from South Africa, where the greater part of the author's ministerial life was spent; it was, we believe, accepted by the authorities of Trinity College, Dublin, as a thesis qualifying for the degree of D.D.

The author's main purpose may be shown by an extract from his Preface:

"All recent literature in English dealing with the resurrection concentrates on the Resurrection of our Lord, and

pays only slight attention to the preliminary question, Do men rise again at all? This treatise reverses the process, and puts the general question in the foreground. This is not done with a view to lessening the prime importance, evidentially and otherwise, of the event of Easter Day. . . . It was God's answer to the hopes and aspirations of the human race from the beginning. History had been leading up to it. So it is placed here in line with men's anxious groping for a solution of the problem of the body's destiny."

In his pursuit of this purpose the author carries his readers from primitive intimations of the doctrine through the Biblical evidence of the Old and New Testaments to give them a *catena* of the most important passages which show how the doctrine was expounded by the post-Apostolic writers, by the Alexandrian School and Tertullian, and by various subsequent writers in the East and West up to the time of the Scholastics and the Reformation. Chapter XVI. has the somewhat strange title, "Later Teaching in the Historical Churches." The Churches meant are the Church of England, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Roman Catholic Church, though in what sense the other Churches are less "historical" is undefined. Two concluding chapters deal with "The Eucharistic Presence and the Risen Body" and the "Moral Dynamic of the Doctrine." Five appendices are added, occupying nearly fifty pages, and are not the least important part of the book. These discuss the use of the word "flesh" in the Hebrew Old Testament, in the LXX, in the Deutero-Canonical books, and in the New Testament; and also the Greek words used in the New Testament for "Resurrection" and its cognates.

It will be seen that the book covers a wide ground. It is a big book—too big, it would seem, for one result of its fulness has been that, under present conditions of publishing, it has been necessary to fix the price at a figure which will be prohibitive for the great majority amongst two of the classes for which the Preface says the book was intended, "the parochial clergy in their dealing with a subject much canvassed at the present time, and theological students in preparation for their sublime vocation." While we must be grateful to the author for the vast amount of material he has laboriously collected, especially from little-known writers like Athenagoras, Methodius, and (above all) Aphraates, we have to confess that there are some directions in which a more judicious sifting of the material would have helped to reduce the work to a more convenient size without sacrifice of its usefulness. Some of the quotations seem quite unnecessarily long; there is too much

repetition; there is some matter that is hardly relevant, as, for example, in the chapter on the Old Testament, in which seven or eight pages are taken up with the Hebrew opinion on a Future Life; there are also to be found passages where space is devoted to "thumbnail sketches of the life-history" of an author, though the notice ends by saying that the writer in question contributes little or nothing to the discussion.

The title of the book will arrest attention by the use of "flesh" instead of "body." In this, however, is contained one of the author's chief points. His position is to be found on pp. 49 *ff.* (together with the first four Appendices). He asserts (p. 49) with reference to the Hebrew Bible:

"The word used for 'flesh' there runs through a whole gamut of meanings from the 'flesh' that is eaten for food to 'flesh' as meaning 'the whole man,' body and soul, or the 'whole humanity.' . . . In Isa. xlix. 26 we have both meanings in a single verse: '*But I will feed them . . . with their own flesh . . . and all flesh* [*i.e.*, all humanity] *shall know that I the Lord am thy Saviour.*'"

It is obvious that in this paragraph "the whole humanity" and "all humanity" express different ideas, yet Dr. Darragh would make them equivalent. When we turn to Appendix A we read that there are five meanings of the Hebrew word *bâsâr*, the last of which is *the whole man, humanity in its completeness*, including the soul as well as the body, *human nature* with emphasis on its frailty and mortality. The third of these phrases is not identical in meaning with the other two, yet this is the meaning of "flesh" in the passages cited. These are twenty-nine in number. Two of them are unverifiable, as the references given are incorrect, and of the others twenty are to the well-known Old Testament phrase "all flesh" (or "no flesh"). Neither in these nor in any of the other seven can we discern any reference to "*humanity in its completeness*, as including soul and body," though in them all there is a reference to "*human nature* with emphasis on its frailty and mortality."

The Greek word σάρξ took over, according to Dr. Darragh, the same meaning to the New Testament, its "final apotheosis" being in John i. 14. On these words his comment is: "*The Word was made Flesh—i.e.*, complete Man." That the Word assumed Human Nature in its completeness is no doubt true, but in John i. 14 the emphasis would seem to be rather on the condescension of the Divine Word in taking to Him human nature with its frailty and mortality. Is it not strange, if the word σάρξ had this meaning for the New Testament writers, that St. Paul never uses the phrase "Resurrection of

the Flesh "? "The form," says Swete (*The Apostles' Creed*, p. 89), "in which this article is cast in the Western Creed is not biblical." It may be, as Swete suggests, that that form is as it is because "Gnostic subtilty could find no way to evade the plain meaning of the phrase *carnis resurrectio*." If so, those who adopted it were emphasizing one part of human nature in opposition to Docetism. When this danger had passed, there was a return at Nicæa to the biblical phrase "resurrection of the dead."

Dr. Darragh's assertion that "the Greek Bishops . . . had forgotten the Hebrew parentage of the word for 'flesh,'" is not convincing; though no doubt the words that follow are true—namely, that they "wished to protect their people from a word which in its purely Greek sense could lead to misunderstanding."

Such misunderstanding there was, whatever may have been the origin of the adoption of the words *resurrectio carnis* in the Creed. It is a defect in the present book that the author fails to present fully instances of such misunderstanding. Attention has been called to this by a critic in the *Church Times* (November 26, 1921) who refers to passages from St. Hippolytus, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and St. Epiphanius. Rufinus, the earliest commentator on the Apostles' Creed, might well have been added. In the Creed of Aquileia the words ran: "*hujus carnis resurrectionem*," and of this clause Rufinus says, after a quotation of the words "*quia resuscitabit pellem meam*" from the Book of Job:

"Nonne aperte dicit hujus carnis resurrectionem futuram, hujus, inquam, quæ tribulationum et tentationum cruciamenta nunc sustinet? Sed et Apostolus cum dicit, Oportet enim corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induere immortalitatem, numquid non corpus suum quodammodo contingentis et digito palpantis est vox?"

It has seemed necessary to write thus fully on this point, as it occurs constantly throughout the book.

That the mystery of the Sacramental Presence of the Risen Body "illuminates the mystery of the resurrection" is another of the author's main contentions. It is the subject of Chapter XVII., and is mentioned in many other places also. The argument depends not on the Real Presence, but on a special theory as to what the Real Presence is. Such an argument might have serious consequences in apologetics. Put as it is by Dr. Darragh, it might be but a short step from the position: "I can believe the mystery of the resurrection, for I believe in the Sacramental Presence of the Risen Body," to another and a very different one: "I cannot believe in the

Sacramental Presence of the Risen Body, therefore I cannot believe in the mystery of the resurrection."

Other points to which some objection might be made are not of such first-rate importance. On p. 28 Dr. Darragh writes: "It becomes necessary to warn the reader that the Fourth Book of Esdras may not be a pre-Christian compilation . . . the date of the book is still disputed amongst scholars." The exact date may be a matter of dispute, but does any scholar now put it in pre-Christian times? Again (p. 70), we have the statement that "the exact date [of the Apostolic Fathers] is not known to a year or two." This is a little too optimistic. A "decade or two" might stand in the case of some, but, if the newest school is to be taken into account, the Didache would require a "century or two."

In a note on p. 224 the statement of the evidence does not seem quite satisfactory. The words are: "'Body' instead of 'flesh' . . . was inserted in *Matins* and *Evensong* in 1552 for the first time in a public service." It might be inferred from this that in 1549 the word was "flesh." This is not the case. In the 1549 Book the Creed was not *printed* in either *Matins* or *Evensong*, but in both there was a direction given that it should be said, and in all probability the form used was that which is found in the *Necessary Doctrine and Erudition of a Christian Man* (1543), which has the word "body."

Lack of space forbids comment on other matters.

If exception has been taken to some of the positions of this book, it is not because its importance has been underrated. On the contrary, it is a valuable contribution to the study of a most important subject. The *catena* of passages here presented will always be important, even if some which should have been given have been passed by. Of special importance are those collected from the writings of Aphraates, the "Persian Sage."

The work as a whole is well printed, but there are a few misprints—*e.g.*, "Totenburg" for "Zotenburg" (p. 110 *n.*), μεταβαλλὼν for μεταβαλὼν (p. 232), "spritual" (p. 262); and the passage quoted (p. 149 *n.*) from Julianus Pomericus seems unintelligible as it stands.

J. M. Harden.

NOTICES

IMPASSE OR OPPORTUNITY? By Malcolm Spencer. Student Christian Movement. 1922. 3s. net.

THIS is a noteworthy eirenicon on the subject of Reunion. Writing as "a Free Churchman," who has had "unique opportunities of entering intimately into the Catholic position," the author discusses the Lambeth proposals with a view to discovering how far they are capable of application. And the result is something so different from any other criticisms of them which we have seen that we ask for them serious attention.

After dwelling on the profound impression made by the spirit of the Lambeth Appeal on all who had been working for Reunion, Mr. Spencer justifies it also in those matters where it has caused disappointment. The refusals to permit interchange of pulpits or intercommunion, or to "recognize" non-episcopal Orders, are, he says, "instances from the Anglican side of that unwillingness to build on conscious ambiguities which our own Free Church spokesmen have in another connection insisted upon, as essential to true fellowship and progress." The strength of the Lambeth plea for episcopacy as necessary to a united Church lies in its adoption of "that estimate of the facts which, by the illumination of the Spirit, God is discovered in history to have taken and to be taking in the life of to-day"; and he shows how the Student Christian Movement ministers to a similar habit of thought.

Mr. Spencer does not object to the insistence upon Creeds, so long as their inadequacy as an expression of Divine truth is not forgotten; but he claims that communions which have been without them have preserved an orthodox faith notwithstanding. Is this true, we wonder, in countries other than our own, where the influence of Catholic standards of belief permeates through so many channels? In regard to Baptism, he insists that the rite alone, unless it is followed up by pastoral care and symbolizes fellowship in the body, savours somewhat of the magical. Here Mr. Spencer has put his finger unawares on the reason why the Church sets such high store by Confirmation—a reason plainly set forth at the end of the Baptismal Office. Progress towards Reunion will falter, unless this problem is fairly faced. The purpose of the two Apostles' visit to Samaria, recorded in Acts viii., was precisely to ensure that Christians whose antecedents made it probable that they would carry over the old schism into the new Church should not do so. It was the first sacrament of Reunion, and is therefore of the highest significance for our present purposes.

Mr. Spencer approaches the Eucharist along psychological lines, omitting doctrinal issues. "The sacramental rite of any particular Church conveys, indeed, the spirit of Christ to the recipient, but not without any admixture of other influences." This "admixture" differs according to different rites; and he claims that the particular effects and benefits imparted by the Catholic rite would not be imparted if it were compromised by confusion with others which mediate other effects. From this standpoint the priest is part of the rite; and the Catholic doctrine and practice of the Ministry coheres with this. Harm arises only when exclusive claims are made on behalf of this rite, as, for instance, when the benefits mediated by other rites with more limited range are denied. At the same time the Eucharist of the united Church must

have a common structure of rite and ceremony if it is to mediate the sense of universality; and it is therefore proper that only those should celebrate it who are "qualified" for it by episcopal ordination. Mr. Spencer suggests that individual ministers should seek this qualification with the consent of their respective Communions; and that the "reciprocity" implied in the Lambeth proposals should be secured by the use of a new rite of Ordination, in which existing Nonconformist ministers should take part.

This little book, brief as it is, has all the weight which comes from honesty, fairness, and patient thought. The author wonders "whether the Bishops could be satisfied with this limited response to their suggestion." We do not know. But that it is a *real* response cannot be gainsaid; and the fact that it is limited is not a disadvantage, since the limits are set for it by circumstances.

E. G. Selwyn.

Community: A Sociological Study. By R. M. MacIver, D.Phil. 2nd Edition. Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. One vol. Pp. 438. 15s. net.

Sociology is a subject which is now attracting more attention than ever before. Men who are weary of the meaningless misery of the last six years hope that a scientific study of the basis of society may do something to remove those misunderstandings between peoples which are at the root of war.

Community was originally printed before the war, but it was written with a full realization of those painful problems which the war has brought home to us. It is unsparing in its criticism of the "militaristic" outlook.

There are important ecclesiastical and religious problems which are really problems of sociology—the relation of Church to State, or the value of the conception of that community, wider than any religious association, which we call the Invisible Church. Though he only deals with them lightly and by way of illustration, there is much in Dr. MacIver's book which must provoke thought on such problems.

The author regards the phenomena of social science as ruled by law; but he distinguishes these laws from the kind met with in physical science. Social laws are "vital," as distinct from "material" laws.

In Chapter II. he defines the essential terms of the subject-matter: the terms "society," "community," "association," and "State."

"Society" is used as the most general term, to include every willed relationship of man to man.

By a "community" is meant any area of common life which must be somehow distinguished from further areas. A community may be a part of a wider community, and all community is a question of degree. The author gives as an example the English residents in a foreign capital who may live together in an intimate community of their own, as well as in the wider community of the capital.

An "association" is an organization of social beings, for the pursuit of some common interest or interests, such as a trade union, or a debating society.

Thus community is something wider and freer than even the greatest associations; it is the greater common life out of which associations rise.

In his discussion of the State, Dr. MacIver rejects the view of Hegel or his followers, which treats the community and State as one. The world is partitioned into a number of exclusive and determinate States

with rigid territorial limits, but it is not similarly partitioned into isolated communities. Moreover, no man can owe allegiance to more than one State, but he may enter into the life of many communities. A State is not a community, but a peculiarly authoritative association within a community, controlling every other association. "The essential feature of the State is political order, the *primary* instrument of the State is political law" (p. 30).

The fundamental law of communal development (to which all its other laws are but corollaries) is expressed as follows: "Socialization and individualization are the two sides of a single process" (p. 219). By socialization is meant the process in which a being strikes deeper root in society, in which his social relations become more complex. By individualization is meant the growth of the power of self-determination and self-expression. As personality grows, non-individualized social interests are transformed into individualized social interests. At the same time community becomes more differentiated, each individual tends more to occupy a unique place in the social structure; thus each individual becomes more and not less socialized. Therefore sociality and individuality develop *pari passu*.

This differentiation of community is from a formless beginning in which the family and the Church were identical with the State. The god was the god of the community, as Jahweh was the god of Israel. The wider and ultra-social character of religion is now so clearly realized that we can hardly understand this original undifferentiation.

The second law of communal development is "the correlation of socialization and communal economy." The term "economy" is used in the widest possible sense to mean the conservation of values not only material but spiritual; the conservation of life and of the intrinsic values of life. This law states that such economy is attained by increased socialization.

The third law of communal development is "the correlation of socialization and the control of environment." With increasing socialization, man must more and more seek to control his environment and refuse to be controlled by it. This law denies absolutely the value of that *laissez-faire* policy, in the face of the threats of hostile Nature, which is the product of a too hasty application of the conception of the survival of the fittest.

Although it deals with an obscure subject, the book is written with admirable lucidity. It is probable that most readers will find themselves in disagreement with Dr. MacIver on some points, as he does not spare his criticism of what he feels to be abuses; but they will always find that what he says is worth listening to.

His conclusions may be summed up in the words of his last chapter: "Blind impulses are superseded by conscious forces," and community moves forward "towards an age for which the records of this present time will be a memory of 'old, unhappy, far-off things.'"

ROBERT H. THOULESS.

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PENITENTIAL DISCIPLINE OF THE EARLY CHURCH IN THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES. By R. S. T. Haslehurst, B.D. S.P.C.K. 1921. One vol., 8vo. Pp. 162. 5s.

"This is largely a catena of passages in which the theory and practice of the early Church is described." The author gives the history of the

book in his Preface. Some three or four years ago in a friendly argument with a Roman priest he was led to give attention to the Christian discipline. He read Marshall, and from Marshall went on to Morinus: and he then "determined to put before my fellow-Churchmen some account of those practices of the Apostles and their immediate successors which we should surely try to follow." A word as to these writers. Morinus (1591-1659) is still a prince among us. Born of Protestant parents, his studies led him to Catholicism. He joined the Parisian Oratory in 1618. How he altered the mind of the Western Church as to the essentials of Holy Orders is well known. But his greatest work was his historical commentary on "the administration of the sacrament of penance." In it will be found an immense number of references to the ancient authors; and even in this age students find it well not to neglect the learned Oratorian. Marshall stands on a lower plane. He is remarkable as an instance of the attitude of an English Churchman in the year (1714) in which Queen Anne died and George I. acceded. He is scholar enough to say that a student wants the original; and he gives a considerable number of passages in Greek and Latin.

In these two writers the present book can find most of its material. And it is given in a very helpful way. First, the passages cited are in their chronological order. Morinus gives them as they fall into the subjects of his chapters. And then they are all given in English translations.

The book is in fact very modest in its claims: "I have had in my mind not so much the professed theological student who has Migne at his elbow as the more amateur student." Such a student will not find elsewhere in the English language an equally full collection of the authorities; and the book may be of service not only to the amateur student, but to the priest of the country parsonage away from books, yet glad to have by him in an English dress the words of honoured writers of the ages past.

Still there are defects. Some guide should be furnished for the use of the *Apostolical Constitutions*. Some indication might be given that the graded system of penance was practically confined to the churches of the Asian provinces, and that it did not extend beyond the fourth century. Again, it might be more clearly shown how different churches differed in their practice.

This last fact has serious bearing on the purpose of the writer. Is it desirable to restore particular practices of discipline which found place in the early Church?

OSCAR D. WATKINS.

CREATIVE PRAYER. By E. Herman. James Clarke and Co.

Written by a lady who knows the difficulties which life's occupations present to prayer, and has also a firm grasp of the principles of prayer as taught by its greatest masters, this book well repays study. It is simple, fresh, and full of experience, and entirely free from cant. It should attract many readers during Lent; and many of them will not have finished with it at Easter.

E. G. SELWYN.

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